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STOCKMARKET VOLATILITY AND 401(K) PLANS
Colleen E. Medill*

Many workers today depend on their 401(k) plan to provide them with an adequate income during retirement. For these workers to achieve retirement income
security, their 401(k) plan investments must peiform well over their working lifetime. Employers' selection of investment options for the 401(k) plan, a fiduciary
duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (AIUSA), plays
a critical role in determining investment peiformance. In this Article, Professor
Medill uses a series of hypothetical litigation scenarios to illustrate how interpretation of the employer's duty of prudence and duty of loyalty under ERISA present
different policy choices for the federal courts. Professor Medill examines various
hypothetical situations involving mutual fund fees and company stock where
ERISA's duty of loyalty will require the federal courts to determine if an employer
has received permissible incidental benefits or engaged in prohibited self-interested
conduct when selecting 401(k) plan investment options.
Because employers today rely upon the Department of Labor's 404(c) Regulations
to allow participants to select among plan investment options without incurring
potential fiduciary liability, Professor Medill examines various policy issues likely
to arise as federal courts interpret the details of the 404(c) Regulations. The A rticle cautions against judicial interpretations of the 404(c) Regulations that will
have a potential chilling effect on voluntary plan sponsorship by employers. The
Article also addresses an important exception to the 404(c) Regulations, the
automatic enrollment plan. Professor Medill argues for a judicial interpretation
of ERISA that encourages employers to select a default investment option for
automatically enrolled participants that is broadly diversifzed in the equity markets, rather than a low-earning money market fund.
The A rticle concludes by examining the potential remedies available under AIUSA
for 401 (k) plan participants injured by their employer's breach offiduciary duty.
Professor Medill concludes that, consistent with existing caselaw precedent, federal courts can and should afford injured 401(k) plan participants a remedy
under ERISA.

*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1985,
University of Kansas; J.D. 1989, University of Kansas School of Law. I would like to thank
Professors Carol Parker and Joan Heminway for their helpful comments, and Lee Robinson
for his excellent research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
469
Published in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 34:3 (Spring, 2001). Copyright (c) 2001 University of Michigan Law School

470

University of Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform

[VOL. 34:3

INTRODUCTION

When baby boomers realize they don't have enough money to retire,
they might start suing their employers over the returns of the funds in
their 401 (k) plans. ... [IJt will eventually dwarf tobacco, firearms
and other product liability litigation.!

Watching the daily performance of the stock market has become America's new national pastime. "What is the market doing
today?" has joined workplace conversations devoted formerly to
sports scores and political elections. With increasing regularity,
the day's lead news story is another market correction or upsurge, or the falling fortunes of a newly public Internet
company.2 Why have we, as a nation, become obsessed with the
gyrations of the stock market? For many, the answer lies in that
much of their personal wealth and the security of their future retirement is tied to the fortunes of the market through their
3
employer-sponsored 401 (k) plan.
Widespread volatility in the stock market has come generally as
a shock to many 401 (k) participants accustomed to enjoying unprecedented investment returns on their retirement funds in
4
recent years. Stock market volatility affects disproportionately employees whose future retirement income is linked to the financial
fortunes of their employers through investments in company stock

1.
Arleen Jacobius, Signet Outcome Could Change How Retirement Plans Are Run, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 17, 1999, at 6.
2.
David P. Hamilton & Mylene Mangalindan, Angels of Death: Reality Bites Hard as
String of Dot·Coms Sees Funding Dry Up, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2000, at AI; Greg Ip & E.S.
Browning, Getting ReaL' What Are Tech Stocks Worth, Now that We Know It Isn't Infinity?, WALL
ST.J., Apr. 17,2000, at AI; Gregory Zuckerman, Despite RaUy, Recovery Is No Sure Thing, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 16, 2000, at Cl; Gregory Zuckerman & E.S. Browning, Shock Treatment: Stocks
Tumble Broadly on Mideast Violence and Earnings Fears, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2000, at AI. Indeed, tracking the financial misfortunes of companies has become something of an Internet
cottage industry in itself. See UPSIDE TODAY DOTCOM GRAVEYARD, at http://
www.upside.com/texis/mvrn/graveyard/index (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Refrmn); FUCKEDCOMPANY, at http://
www.fuckedcompany.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Refrmn); StartupFAILURES, at http://www.startupfailures.com (last visited
Jan. 18, 2001) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Refrmn).
3.
The 401 (k) plan takes its name from the Internal Revenue Code section from
which it is derived. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 93 (5th ed. 1997). In a 401(k) plan, the employee elects to have her
employer contribute a portion of her compensation to the plan instead of receiving that
compensation as current income. Id. at 94-95.
4.
Mike Clowes, Reversion Could Be Mean, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at
10.
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5

held in a 401 (k) plan. Stock market volatility raises new legal issues concerning an employer's responsibilities in establishing and
operating 401 (k) plans for their employees. To date, these issues,
and perhaps more importantly, their implications for national re6
tirement policy, have not been explored by legal scholars. The first
significant wave of litigation concerning these issues is beginning to
7
reach the federal courts. These cases have garnered substantial attention in the press,s leading experts to predict that litigation
involving 401 (k) plans will become commonplace in the future. 9
This new genre of 401 (k) plan litigation is likely to arise under
three scenarios. The first scenario involves a substantial and
sustained downward correction in the overall stock market. The
second scenario involves an employer who offers its own publicly
traded stock as an investment option for its employees' 401 (k)
plan. Under either of these scenarios, unhappy 401 (k) plan

5.
See infra note 52.
6.
Publications on the subject to date have focused narrowly on the technical legal
requirements for participant directed 401 (k) plans. See generally Keith R. Pyle, Compliance
Under ERISA Section 404(c) with Increasing Investment Alternatives and Account Accessibility, 32
IND. L. REv. 1467 (1999) (analyzing the requirements of ERISA section 404(c) and assessing
compliance difficulties resulting from a large number of investment alternatives and automated interaction by participants); Yolanda Sayles, Section 404(c) Plan Fees and Expenses: Is
There an Affirmative Duty to Disclose?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1461 (1999) (arguing that
courts should find in ERISA section 404(c) an affirmative fiduciary duty to disclose fee and
expense information to plan participants).
7.
See Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726 (E.D. Va. 2000);
Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-5417, 1, 82-87 (E.D. Pa. filed june 14,
2000, amended july 25, 2000), available at http://www.newyorklifesuit.com (last visited
Mar. 31, 2001); Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. CV-00-04139, AHM (MANx) ,
1, 34-41 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 2000, amended Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
8.
See Russ Banham, Defending Your 401(k), CFO MAG., Apr. 1,2000, at 69; David B.
Brandolph, Investments: Lawsuit Alleges Misuse of Plan Assets to Create Insurer's Mutual Fund
Vehicles, PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY REp.,june 21, 2000, at D22; Albert B. Crenshaw, Employees Sue SBC over Stock in 401 (k), WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at E3; Elayne R. Demby,
Proprietary Problems, PLAN SPONSOR,july-Aug. 1999, at 72; Robert S. England, When Pensions
Change Hands, CFO MAG., Aug. 1999, at 69; Phyllis Feinberg, Class Action: New York Life Is
Bracingfor Lawsuit, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 29, 2000, at 1; Guy Halverson, Sure You're
Secure? How to Spot Flaws in a 401(k), CHRISTIAN SCI. MONIToR,june 12,2000, at 15; Vanessa
Hua, Conflicts Arise from 401(k) Plans, S.F. EXAMINER,june 18, 2000, at Dl; Arleenjacobius, A
Change in Plans? SBC Suit May Alter Running of 401 (k)s, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 1,
2000, at 6; joel J. Meyer, Class Action Filed Alleging Company Manipulated Tax Code Section
401(k) Plan, 27 PENSIONS & BENEFITS REp. 1084 (2000);jeff D. Opdyke & Ellen E. Schultz,
SBC Faces Suit Over Retirement Plans, WALL ST. j., Apr. 19, 2000, at A2; Ellen E. Schultz & Ken
Brown, New York Life'S Pension Plans Raise Questions, WALL ST.J.,june 12,2000, at CI.
9.
See Banham, supra note 8, at 69-70; Barry B. Burr, 401 (k)s Next Target of Suits?, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 15, 2000, at 10; Arleenjacobius, 401(k) Precedent? First Union Suit
May Help Define Responsibility, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter
Jacobius, 401(k) Precedent?l;jacobius, supra note I, at 124; Linda E. Rosenzweig, 401(k) Plan
Litigation Increases, N.Y.LJ.,june 19,2000, at 9, 11.
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participants who suffer significant investment losses are likely to
seek relief in the federal courts.
The third scenario for future 401 (k) plan litigation is distinctly
different from the first two. Under this scenario, the stock market
continues to rise. The 401 (k) plan participants do not suffer an
investment loss. Rather, the gravamen of employee complaint is
that the participants suffered an opportunity loss. In other words,
based on the stock market's rising performance, their 401 (k) plan
accounts should have earned more than they actually did.
Under each scenario, the participants' claims must be made under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 10 the
federal statute that exclusively governs the rights of 401 (k) plan
participants and the responsibilities of the employers who sponsor
them!1 This Article explores the issues that are likely to arise in
future 401 (k) plan litigation sparked by stock market volatility.
ERISA's statutory language itself is unhelpful. The key to resolving
these issues lies in the federal regulations and caselaw that grant
12
broad discretion to the federal courts. The exercise of this judicial discretion will, in effect, place the federal judiciary in a
controversial policy-making role.
In his article, Judges As Advicegivers, 13 Professor Neal Kumar
Katyal describes one of the historical roles of the federal courts as
giving advice on matters of public policy. He advocates this advicegiving role in the limited context of constitutional cases heard by
14
the Supreme Court. Although lower federal court cases involving the interpretation of ERISA are certainly not as glamorous as
constitutional litigation, Chief Justice Rehnquist himself acknowledged publicly that such cases are likely to be of much more
15
practical importance.
10.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp.1I 1996).
11.
Title I of ERISA regulates all types of employee pension benefit plans, including
401 (k) plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3) (defining employee benefit plan), 1003(a) (defining
ERISA's coverage) (1994). Employee benefit plans sponsored for employees of federal,
state or local governments or agencies or churches generally are excluded from coverage
under Title I of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Unfunded executive
deferred compensation plans, or "top hat" plans, are also excluded. Peter J. Wiedenbeck,
J<."'RlSA s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 342 (1998).
12.
ERISA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions involving
an employer's breach of fiduciary duties under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(l) (1994).
The types of civil actions that may be brought by participants in a 401 (k) plan for an employer's breach of fiduciary duty are discussed infra Part II. No right to a jury trial exists for
breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA; the federal district court judge acts as the trier
offact. A.B.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw 634-35 (1991).
13.
50 STAN. L. REv. 1709 (1998).
14.
Id.atl711.
15.
In a 1997 speech at the dedication of the Harrison Law Grounds at the University
of Virginia Law School, ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated:
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Judge Abner J. Mikva responds to Professor Katyal by arguing
that a conscious practice of advice-giving by federal judges is inappropriate because "you could not find a group of people less
experienced and less suited to legislative decision making than federaljudges.,,16 He contends that most judges prefer to avoid telling
"policymakers how to make policy" by writing judicial opinions
17
that omit nonessential dicta. Judge Mikva's assertion is true for
policy issues under ERISA, a notoriously technical area of law.
Nevertheless, the federal courts, rather than Congress, usually
have the final word on ERISA's fiduciary policy. Employers who
sponsor retirement plans for their employees (or, perhaps more
accurately, the highly specialized ERISA experts who counsel
them) scrutinize judicial opinions for "advice" concerning an employer's fiduciary responsibilities and conform their behavior
accordingly. IS Thus, no matter how narrowly a judge tailors her
holding to the specific facts of the case, in ERISA matters, the primary audience will attempt to read "advice" into it. Worse, is the
situation in which, although attempting to issue an opinion based
strictly on the facts of the case, a judge unknowingly and inadvertently sends out policy signals to the employee benefits
community. This unconscious advice-giving by the federal judiciary
leads to unprincipled policy. Finally, the federal judiciary cannot
rationalize its policy-making role on the assumption that Congress
can always amend the statute. The statutory sections at issue in
ERISA fiduciary litigation remain unchanged since their original
enactment in 1974. Any attempts to amend these provisions will

If one examines the current offerings of the University of Virginia Law School, one
learns that this year there are some 160 courses offered, and some 90 seminars. This
is an intellectual feast that stands in sharp contrast, certainly, to the offerings of my
law school when I attended long ago. When one looks further, one sees that there
are at least three courses offered just on the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. BY'contrast, there seems to be no course offering devoted to federal
regulation of employer-employee benefit and retirement plans-an area of the law
which is much less glamorous, receives much less media attention, but the ramifications of which have a far greater effect on the daily lives of people than do the
nuances of First Amendment law. Surely practitioners are much more likely to have
clients with pension and benefit plan problems than with separation of church and
state problems.
Chief justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Dedication of the David A. Harrison II
Law Grounds, University of Virginia (Nov. 8, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
16.
Abner J. Mikva, «-7Iy Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to ProJessor Neal
Katya~ 50 STAN. L. REv. 1825, 1827 (1998).
17.
[d. at 1826.
18.
See England, supra note 8, at 74;jacobius, supra note 8 at 6; jacobius, supra note 9,
at 61.
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spark interest group battles of titanic proportions that will lead to
the classic congressional response: inaction. 19
This pragmatic Article considers a third approach to advicegiving by the federal courts-one that lies somewhere between the
positions of Professor Katyal and Judge Mikva. Unlike Professor
Katyal's elite area of constitutional law, ERISA is an area in which
most federal judges would be the first to admit that their policy
expertise, if it exists at all, is limited. Yet contrary to Judge Mikva's
view, the coming wave of 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation will thrust
the federal judiciary, albeit perhaps unwillingly, into the role of
shaping future national retirement policy. The federal courts'
"advice" will not be given to Congress, but primarily to the employers who sponsor 401 (k) plans, and, more importantly, to the
employee benefits experts who counsel them.
National retirement policy ~ill be better served by a federal judiciary that is cognizant of the policy implications its decisions will
have on future 401 (k) plan litigation. This Article intends to sensitize the federal courts to the policy choices and ramifications that
underlie the novel legal issues ushered in by today's new world of
stock market volatility and 40I"(k) plans.
Part I overviews the rise to prominence of the participant directed 401 (k) plan. Part I also introduces the three primary
fiduciary duties ERISA imposes upon employers who sponsor retirement plans: the duties of prudence, loyalty, and prudent
diversification of plan assets.
Part II analyzes how each of these fiduciary duties potentially
applies in the context of participant directed 401 (k) plans. This
analysis emphasizes the policy-making role the federal courts will
play in interpreting and applying ERISA's duties to employers who
sponsor 401 (k) plans. In Part II and continuing throughout the
remainder of the Article, a series of hypotheticals are used to illustrate and discuss the legal issues and policy choices the federal
courts will confront in future 401 (k) plan litigation under ERISA.
Part II begins with an analysis of the employer's duty of prudence in selecting the investment options for its 401 (k) plan. This
analysis is divided into two sections. First the employer's decisionmaking process in selecting various mutual funds as investment
options for its 401 (k) plan is analyzed. Second, the additional factors an employer should consider if it also chooses to include
19.
The aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508
U.S. 248 (1993), is a prime example. Subsequent legislative attempts to override the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of employer fiduciary liability under
ERISA section 502(a) (3) were abandoned in the face of interest group opposition. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 724-25 (2d ed. 1995).
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company stock as an investment option for its 401 (k) plan is examined. Next, Part II analyzes the employer's duty of loyalty in
selecting mutual funds and company stock as investment options.
The close connection between fees and expenses to the employer's
selection of mutual funds for the plan's investment options, and
how this connection creates a potential conflict of interest for the
sponsoring employer is also discussed. Another potential conflict
of interest arises when an employer includes company stock as an
investment option, which can lead to potential breaches of the
employer's duty ofloyalty under ERISA.
Part II, finally, examines the duty of prudent diversification of
plan assets. Here, the growing tendency among employers to
automatically enroll their employees in 401 (k) plans and the
unique policy challenge that this relatively recent development
present to the federal courts is addressed. Part II ends with a discussion of the employer's regulatory defense to alleged breaches
of the duty of prudent diversification in the context of participant
directed 401 (k) plans. This discussion also outlines the policymaking role the federal courts will playas they interpret and apply
this employer defense in future 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation.
Part III analyzes the potential remedies available under ERISA
for breaches of the employer's fiduciary duties of prudence, loyalty, and prudent diversification of plan assets. It begins with an
overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning ERISA
remedies. Part III then builds upon Part II by presenting a series of
hypothetical scenarios where the federal courts must determine
whether, given a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer, a remedy is available under ERISA to the participants in the employer's
401 (k) plan. Part III emphasizes the policy choices that the federal
courts will be making as they interpret and apply ERISA's remedy
provisions to 401 (k) plans.
I.

BACKGROUND:

How WE BECAME A "401 (K)

NATION,,2o

ERISA, enacted in 1974,21 predates the authorization of the
401 (k) plan. 22 Nevertheless, ERISA's fiduciary responsibility
20.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp. (June 28,1999) (front cover).
21.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974).
22.
The 401(k) plan became possible as a result of changes made to the Internal
Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 135, 92 Stat. 2763, 2785
(1978) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 401(k»; Colleen E. Medill, The Individual
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provisions govern the conduct of employers who sponsor 401 (k)
23
plans. In addition, ERISA provides the exclusive remedies
available to 401 (k) participants when an employer breaches its
24
ERISA fiduciary duties.
That ERISA was enacted prior to the development of the 401 (k)
plan is critically important, yet easily overlooked. The chronology
explains in large part the interpretative difficulties and related policy choices the federal courts will confront in attempting to apply
ERISA's statutory provisions to employers who sponsor 401 (k)
plans. These interpretive difficulties and policy choices are described in Parts II and III below, but to set the stage, an overview of
the participant directed 401 (k) plan's rise to prominence is necessary.
ERISA generally imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty,25 prudence,26
27
and prudent diversification of plan assets upon employers who
sponsor retirement plans. ERISA's duty of prudent diversification
of plan assets historically presented a major obstacle to participant
directed investments in 401 (k) plans. In a 401 (k) plan, an employee elects to contribute part of her compensation to the plan
28
instead of receiving that money as current income. Because the
plan is funded with an employee's own money, many employees
prefer to have a voice in how their retirement savings are in29
vested. Employers were reluctant in 1974, however, to turn
investment control for a traditional defined benefit plan over to
their employees. Employers feared that ERISA's duty of prudent
diversification of plan assets would render them liable for investment losses suffered by participants who did not select a diversified
range of investments for their 401 (k) plan accounts.
This fear was well-founded. Numerous studies of participant directed investments in 401 (k) plans indicate that, although plan
investments may be diversified investments on an aggregate basis,

Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY LJ.
1,7 & n.26 (2000).
23.
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
24.
[d. §§ 1001, 1132(a)(2),(3) (1994). ERISA preempts state law causes of action for
an employer'S breach of fiduciary duty. [d. § 1144(a).
25.
[d. § 1l04(a)(l) (A); see also Donovan v. BieIWirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir.
1982).
26.
[d. § 1l04(a)(I)(B).
27.
[d. § 1l04(a)(I)(C).
28.
See supra note 3.
29.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG., INC., REpORT G-61, PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON INVESTMENT PREFERENCES 19 (1994) (sixty-two percent of survey
respondents want to make their own retirement plan investment decisions).
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many individual participants do not select a diversified range of
30
investments for the retirement funds in their accounts.
As of 1996, ERISA exempts employers from liability for investment losses when plan participants control the investment of their
31
individual retirement plan accounts. This statutory exemption,
commonly referred to as section 404(c) ofERISA,32 provides as follows:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual
accounts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise
control over assets in his account, if a participant or beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as
determined under regulations of the Secretary)(A) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to
be a fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and
(B) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary33 shall be liable
under this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which
results from such participant's or beneficiary's exercise of
34
I
contro.
35
Obviously, it was essential for the Department of Labor to issue
regulations for an employer to qualify for the section 404(c) exemption. Until that time, the employer's potential liability for
participant directed investment losses was uncertain. These regula36
tions (404(c) Regulations) were finalized in 1992.

30.
JACK VANDERHEI ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG.,
INC., ISSUE BRIEF 218, 401 (K) PLAN AsSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN
ACTIVITY IN 1998 12, 13 (2000); Medill, supra note 22, at 18-23.
31.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(l) (Supp. II 1996).
32.
The Small BusinessJob Protection Act ofl996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1421(d)(2),
110 Stat. 1755, 1799 (1996) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (c)(I», amended ERISA, renumbering section 404(c) as section 404(c)(I).
33.
This reference to persons who are otherwise fiduciaries includes the named plan
fiduciary, who is typically the sponsoring employer or union. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1994). It
also includes other plan fiduciaries, such as the plan's trustee, under ERISA's general definition ofa fiduciary. [d. § 1002(21)(A).
34.
29 U.S.C. § 1l04(c) (1) (emphasis added).
35.
The Secretary of Labor has administrative authority over the fiduciary provisions
of Title I of ERISA. Reorganization Plan No.4 ofl978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713, 47,713 (Oct. 17,
1978). The legislative history of section 404(c), discussed infra Part II.B.3.a., is scant. See
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302-06 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038, 508385.
36.
Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l).
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Since the issuance of the final 404(c) Regulations, partICIpant
directed 401 (k) plans have become increasingly popular with both
37
employers and employees. In turn, national retirement policy has
become increasingly dependent on 401 (k) plans. In 1984, the first
year for which data is available, there were 7.5 million employees
participating in 17,303 401 (k) plans sponsored by their employS8
ers. By 1995, the number of 401 (k) plans increased to 200,813,
and the number of participating employees increased to 28 mil39
lion. In that same year, fifty-five percent of all contributions to
40
employer-sponsored retirement plans were to 401 (k) plans. A
1999 study of 491 companies found that forty-one percent of
401 (k) plans represented the employee's primary source of re41
tirement income, an increase from thirty-five percent in 1995.
Significantly, almost all 401 (k) plans today allow plan participants
to direct the investment of their 401 (k) plan retirement savings.42
Before turning to the fiduciary responsibilities ERISA places on
employers who sponsor 401 (k) plans, it is important to understand
why the federal courts are just beginning to address these issues.
The rise in popularity and prevalence of the 401 (k) plan has coincided with the longest running bull market in the history of
43
United States equity markets. Many new 401 (k) plan participants
were inexperienced investors and wrongly believed they possessed
the Midas touch. Satisfied employees, in turn, made for compla44
cent empI ayers.
37.
Employers favor 401 (k) plans because, unlike other types of retirement plans, they
are funded by the employees themselves through salary deferrals. See supra note 3. Employees like 401 (k) plans because, unlike other types of retirement plans, the employee's
retirement benefits are portable, and the employee has control over the level of her retirement savings and the investment of the retirement funds. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF 401(K) PLAN FEES AND EXPENSES § I (1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba.
38.
PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION
PLAN BULL. 8, Abstract of 1995 Form 5500 Annual Reports, Table E23 (1999), http://
www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001).

39.

[d.

40.
SYLVESTER K. SCHIEBER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & AsS'N OF
PRiVATE PENSION & WELFARE PLANS, STRETCHING THE PENSION DOLLAR: IMPROVING U.S.
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND NATIONAL SAVINGS BY ENHANCING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSIONS
9 (1999).
41.
Hewitt Associates, Trends & Experience in 401(k) Plans (1999), at http://
www.hewittcom/hewitt (last visited on May 7, 2001) (on file with author).
42.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 2517, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1997, at 135 (1999), available at
http://stats.bls.gov (last visited May 7, 2001) (eighty-six percent of 401 (k) plans permit the
employee to choose investments for their plan contributions).
43.
See Clowes, supra note 4; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Change Agent: Haw Alan Greenspan
Finally Came to Terms with the Stock Market, WALL ST. j., May 8, 2000, at AI.
44.
See Banham, supra note 8, at 69-70.
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Today's stock market volatility has upset the equilibrium. AJ5 a
result, employees are beginning to scrutinize their 401 (k) plans
and to ask questions of their employers (and their own lawyers).45
Employers, many for the first time, are examining nervously their
ERISA fiduciary responsibilities and potential liability in sponsor46
ing 401 (k) plans. What both groups will find, unfortunately, IS a
legal quagmire.

II.

EMPLOYER FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE 404(C) REGULATIONS

A. Introduction to Litigation Scenarios

The 404(c) Regulations require that for a 401 (k) plan part.J.clpant to "exercise control" over the assets in her account, the plan
must provide certain informational disclosures to the plan participants and must be designed to offer a broad range of diversified
47
investment options. To satisfy these requirements, 401 (k) plans
usually offer mutual funds as plan investment options. 48 The result
has been a significant growth in both mutual fund participation
and investment in the stock market by the average American
49
worker.
45.
See id. at 70; Halverson, supra note 8, at 18. The Department of Labor's Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration actively encouraged employee scrutiny of their 401 (k)
plans by issuing a nineteen page booklet titled A Look at 401(k) Plan Fees. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A LOOK AT 401 (K) PLAN FEES ... FOR
EMPLOYEES § 1 (1998), available at httpllwww.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7,2001);
see also Elizabeth White, DOL Issues Section 401(k) Fee Guide, Continues to Consider Further &
quirements, 25 PENSIONS & BENEFITS REp. 1545 (1998). The booklet contains a checklist of
ten questions for 401 (k) plan participants to ask their employers. PENSION & WELFARE
BENEFITS ADMIN., supra, § 6.
46.
See Banham, supra note 8, at 70-74;Jacobius, supra note 9, at 61.
47.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (i), (b) (3) (i) (2000).
48.
See infra Part n.B.3.b.
49.
A mutual fund industry study conducted by the Investment Company Institute
found that, in 1999, mutual funds constituted forty·five percent of all 401 (k) plan assets.
Mutual Funds and the Retirement Market, FUNDAMENTALS: INVESTMENT COMPANY REs. IN
BRIEF (Inv. Co. Inst.), May 2000, at 7, available at http://www.ici.org (last visited May 7,
2001). In 1990, this figure was just nine percent. Id. Mutual fund investments today are the
largest segment of 401 (k) plan assets. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37,
§ 2.4.1. A few 401 (k) plans are operated essentially like brokerage accounts that allow par·
ticipants to invest in individual stocks. See Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,921 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-l);Jon C. Chambers, Unrestricted Investment Accounts in Participant-Directed Plans:
Problems and Solutions, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Aug. 1997, at 42,42 (discussing trend
toward offering 401 (k) plan participants greater flexibility in investments choices offered
through retirement plans); Aaron Lucchetti, Funds: Trading Comes to Retirement Plans, AsIAN
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at 21 (reporting on a survey showing that more workers want
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The 404(c) Regulations also permit the employer to offer com50
pany stock as an investment option. A study of the investment
choices made by 401 (k) plan participants indicates that when
company stock is offered as an investment option, 32.7% of em51
ployees select it as one of their investments. A significant number
of these employees invest heavily in company stock, which is an
investment strategy fraught with risk. 52
As 401 (k) plan investments, both mutual funds and company
stock are subject to stock market volatility. Consequently, litigation
between employers and employees involving 401 (k) plan investments is likely to arise under three scenarios. The first scenario
involves a substantial and sustained downward correction in the
stock market generally. The second scenario involves an employer
who selects its own publicly traded company stock as an investment
option for the 401 (k) plan. If the market value of the company
stock declines, so will the retirement savings of those employees
who invested in the stock through the 401 (k) plan. Under either
of these first two scenarios, unhappy 401 (k) plan participants who
sustain significant investment losses may sue the plan's sponsoring
employer for breach of a fiduciary duty under ERISA. 53

their employers to offer a trading option as part of their 401 (k) plans). A recent study conducted by the Profit Sharing/ 401 (k) Council of America found that ten percent of 401 (k)
plans today offer such brokerage windows, up from one percent in 1993. Clifton Linton,
Self-Directed 401 (k)s nxpand Investment Choices, at http://www.401kafe.com (last visited May 7,
2001) (on file with author).
50.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (3).
51.
VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 30, at II (tbI.5); see also Medill, supra note 22, at 2023 (discussing results of older studies on investment plans with company stock options). As
of 1995, of the $773,941,000,000 in total assets held in 401 (k) plans, $II4,370,OOO,OOO, or
14.8%, were employer securities. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 38, at
tbl.D6. A more recent private survey of employers found that as of 1997, thirty-seven percent
of 401 (k) plans offered company stock as an investment option. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.4.3.
52.
Dr. John H. Langbein, Reforming ERISA Investment Law, Statement at a Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Committee on
Education and the Workforce, 106th Congo (Feb. 15,2000) [hereinafter Reforming ERISA]
(on file with author); Christine Dugas, Don't Bank 40I(k) Empluyer's Stock, If Company Hits Bad
Spot, Retirement Plan Can Tank, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2000, at 3B;Jane Bryant Quinn, Empluy
Caution with Company Stock, WASH. POST, July 2, 2000, at H2; John Rekenthaler, The Truth
About Company Stock, THE 401 (K) WIRE, July 13, 2000, at http://www.401kWire.com (last
visited on May 7, 2001) (on file with author). Professor Susan Stabile has criticized large
investments in employer stock as a form of double jeopardy for the plan participant. In the
event the employer becomes insolvent, the employee who invested heavily in the employer's
stock will have lost both his current income and his retirement savings. Susan]. Stabile,
Pension Plan Investments in Empluyer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE]. ON REG. 61,
79 (1998).
53.
For a discussion of potential ERISA claims and remedies for these litigation scenarios, see infra Parts II.B., III.
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The third litigation scenario contemplates a continued spectacular rise in the stock market. Under this scenario, the participants'
401 (k) plan investments do not lose money; rather, the participants' complaint is that the employer invested their 401 (k) plan
money too conservatively in a safe, but low-earning, money market
mutual fund. As a result, their 401 (k) plan accounts did not earn
as much as they otherwise would have if the employer had invested
more broadly in the stock market. The participants' alleged injury
is one of a lost opportunity to share in the stock market's overall
rise. This third scenario is made possible by a new and growing
trend in the world of 401 (k) plans: the development of the socalled "automatic enrollment" 401 (k) plan.
In resolving these claims, the federal courts must, of course, defer to any reasonable Department of Labor interpretation of
ERISA's statutory language if a court determines that the statute is
54
silent or ambiguous on the issue. Consequently, in describing the
current state of ERISA fiduciary law below, relevant Department of
Labor regulations and official pronouncements are incorporated.
What will become evident is that the Department of Labor, at key
policy junctures, effectively delegated its own policy-making
authority with respect to 401 (k) plans to the federal courts.

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against the Emplayer

In its official commentary accompanying the 404(c) Regulations, the Department of Labor took pains to make clear that an
employer's failure to comply with the requirements of the 404(c)
Regulations is not, in itself, a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer.55 Consequently, the initial burden under all the litigation
scenarios falls on the 401 (k) plan participants to prove that the

54.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)
(holding that, when a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, courts should give
deference to a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency entrusted with administering the statute); Herman v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1997)
("Unless Congress, in enacting ERISA, demonstrated clearly its intent with regard to the
questions before us, we must defer to the Secretary's official interpretations of ERISA if they
are reasonable."); cf Sayles, supra note 6, at 1493-98 (arguing that the federal courts should
impose an affirmative fiduciary duty of disclosure on employers beyond ERISA's § 404(c)
regulatory requirements).
55.
Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,906-07 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l).
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plan's sponsoring employer breached one or more of its statutory
fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a).56
Participants in 401 (k) plans are likely to allege three possible
violations of the employer's fiduciary duties: breach of the employer's duty of prudence; breach of the employer's duty of loyalty;
or breach of the employer's duty of prudent diversification of plan
assets. The employer's duties of prudence and loyalty are discussed
below in Subparts B1 and 2. The employer's duty of prudent diversification of plan assets is discussed in Subpart 3 in connection with
the 404 (c) Regulations.
1. The Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting 401(k) Plan Investment options
a. Established Legal Standards-ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) requires the employer to discharge his duties with respect to a plan:

with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con57
duct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
The legislative history states that lawmakers "expect[ed] that the
courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary
56.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). ERISA's statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty claims is unlikely to present a serious obstacle to the types of claims described in
this Article. Under ERISA section 413, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the employer
must be brought within the earlier of:
(1) six years after (A) the date of the last action which constituted a part of the
breach or violation, or (B) in the case of an omission, the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation, or
(2) three years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the breach or violation;
except that in the case of fraud or concealment, such action may be commenced not
later than six years after the date of discovery of such breach or violation.
29 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994). The federal courts construe strictly the actual knowledge requirement of ERISA section 413(2) that triggers the shorter three year statute of limitations
period. Brown v. Am. Life Holdings, Inc., 190 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 1999) (summarizing
caselaw); Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1178 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that actual
knowledge requires more than mere knowledge that the transaction giving rise to the alleged breach occurred). The federal courts also have used the "continuing breach" theory
effectively to extend the statute of limitations period. E.g., Starr v. lCI Data Processing, Inc.,
767 F. Supp. 633, 636-38 (D.N]. 1991); Dole v. Formica, 14 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
1397,1405-06 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding that each time the plans paid an excessive administrative fee, the plans were harmed and a new cause of action arose).
57.
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(B).
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standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans.,,58 Thus, from the outset, Congress
contemplated that the federal courts would incorporate policy
considerations into their analysis of ERISA's fiduciary duty standards.
Traditionally, ERISA cases interpreting the employer's duty of
prudence have arisen when an investment manager or other plan
fiduciary, rather than the employees, has selected and managed
the plan's investments. 59 Nevertheless, several general principles
applicable to today's participant directed 401 (k) plan emerge from
that well-developed body of judicial precedent.
First, an employer's subjective good faith is not a defense-"a
'pure heart and an empty head are not enough" to satisfy the duty
of prudence. 6o Second, prudence is to be evaluated based on the
61
circumstances at the time a decision is made. In particular, the
eventual investment result, good or bad, does not establish com62
pliance with or a breach of the duty of prudence. Third, the

58.
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5083; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 V.S. 489, 497 (1996); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716
F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir. 1983); H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974
V.s.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N.
4838,4865.
.
59.
SeeGIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton &Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 73031 (llth Cir. 1990); Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 953-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 273-80 (2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226,
1228-31 (9th Cir. 1983). An exception is the case of In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 21
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2514,2516 (E.D. Pa. 1997), where the participants alleged
that the employer breached its duty of prudence in purchasing guaranteed investment
contracts (GICs) from Executive Life Insurance Company of California (Executive Life).
The Executive Life GICs constituted approximately fifteen to twenty percent of one of the
investment options in these participant directed retirement plans, one of which was a
401(k) plan. Id. at 2516-17,2518,2530 (findings offact numbers I, 5,15, and 79). When
Executive Life later was placed into conservatorship by California insurance company regulators, the GICs eventually paid a lower rate of interest than called for in the purchase
contract. In re Vnisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1999). Although the In re
Unisys case applies the employer's duty of prudence in the context of a participant directed
401 (k) plan, its factual setting is unusual. The case does not address the more common
types of factual situations presented in this Article. The case also predates the effective date
of the final 404(c) Regulations. See Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-l).
60.
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983).
61.
In re Vnisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996); Katsaros, 744 F.2d at
279; see also DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 720 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (N.D. III.
1989) (stating "fiduciary duty of care requires prudence, not prescience").
62.
In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (stating that the court is to focus on "a fiduciary's conduct in arriving at an investment decision, not on its results"); Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator
Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating the "prudent person standard is not
concerned with results"); Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass'n & Glaziers, 507 F. Supp. 378, 384
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employer may need to seek the assistance of outside experts prior
63
to making plan investment decisions.
The duty of prudence has both objective and subjective compo64
nents. Subjectively, it is well established that the duty of prudence
generally requires the employer to conduct a thorough investiga65
tion prior to making an investment decision. The regulations
describe this employer duty as follows:
With regard to an investment or investment course of action
taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant to
his investment duties, the requirements of section
404(a) (1) (B) of the Act ... are satisfied if the fiduciary:
(i) Has given appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that ... the fiduciary knows or should know are
relevant to the particular investment or investment course of
action involved, including the role the investment or investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan's
investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has
investment duties; and
(ii) Has acted accordingly.66

In evaluating the objective merits of an investment, "appropriate
consideration"
include[s], but is not necessarily limited to,
(i) A determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably
designed, as part of the portfolio ... to further the purposes
of the plan, taking into consideration the risk of loss and the
opportunity for gain ... associated with the investment or investment course of action, and
(D. Haw. 1980) (noting "even the most carefully evaluated investments can fail while unpromising investments may succeed").
63.
Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1992); Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680
F.2d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Tricario, 5 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2057,2064 (S.D. Fla. 1984). The employer cannot, however, rely blindly on the recommendations of an outside expert. Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1996);
Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1474; Mazzola, 716 F.2d at 1234.
64.
Fink, 772 F.2d at 962 ("In short, there are two related but distinct duties imposed
upon a trustee: to investigate and evaluate investments, and to invest prudently.") (Scalia,].,
concurring and dissenting); Whitfield v. Cohen, 682 F. Supp. 188, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
65.
In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434; Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 279.
66.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-l (b) (1) (2000).
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(ii) Consideration of the following factors ...

(A) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio
relative to the anticipated cash flow requirement of the
plan; and
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the

funding objectives of the plan.

67

Finally, the federal courts have long viewed duty of prudence as a
highly flexible standard, to be "evaluated in light of the 'character
and aims' of the particular type of plan [the fiduciary] serves.,,68
Many of these general principles, developed in the context of
plans where a fiduciary selected the plan's investments, can be
transferred to today's participant directed 401 (k) plan. The logical
corollary in the 401 (k) plan setting is the employer's selection of
investment menu options from which the participants will make
their investment choices. The Department of Labor imposes
minimal requirements for the range of investment options that
69
must be offered in participant directed 401 (k) plans. As a result,
the employer has broad discretion in selecting these investment
options.
This exercise of employer discretion in selecting the investment
options for the 401 (k) plan is a fiduciary function subject to the
general duty of prudence. In the official commentary to the 404(c)
Regulations, the Department of Labor emphasized that
the act of designating investment alternatives ... in an ERISA
section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not applicable.
All of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA remain applicable to
both the initial designation of investment alternatives ... and
the ongoing determination that such alternatives ... remain
70
suitable and prudent alternatives for the plan.

Id. § 2550.404a·l (b) (2).
In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434 (quoting Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1467).
69.
See infra II.B.3.
70.
Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l); see also Office of
Pension & Welfare Benefit Programs, Dep't of Labor, Op. Ltr. 98-06A Uuly 30,1998).
67.
68.
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Thus, compliance with the 404(c) Regulations is not a defense
to an employer's breach of the duty of prudence (or duty of loyalty'l) in selecting and monitoring the 401 (k) plan's menu of
investment options.
An employer, of course, may argue that its selection of investment options for the 401 (k) plan is a plan design decision made in
72
the employer's nonfiduciary capacity as "settlor" of the plan.
However, in interpreting this employer duty as a fiduciary one, the
Department of Labor anticipated and expressly rejected the settlor
function argument. The federal courts should do likewise.'3
b. Policy Choices: Employer Burden Versus Participant ProtectionThe following hypothetical and discussion introduce application of
the duty of prudence to the employer's selection of investment options in a 401 (k) plan. This hypothetical is used and developed
throughout the Article to articulate the broad policy considerations that the federal courts face in interpreting and applying
ERISA's fiduciary provisions to 401 (k) plans.

FIRST HYPOTHETICAL

Employer decides to establish a participant directed 401 (k) plan. Employer goes to Full Service Provider, who furnishes both the necessary
plan documents and administrative services for the 401 (k) plan. The
Full Service Provider also sponsors various mutual funds that are potential investment options under the plan. Employer selects seven of
these mutual funds-four equity funds, two bond funds, and a
money market fund-as the investment options for the 401 (k) plan.
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer has
satisfied its fiduciary duty of prudence in selecting these investment
options.

The first hypothetical represents the most common approach to
401 (k) plan sponsorship by employers. All but the largest employSee infra Part II.B.2.
See discussion of the settlor function doctrine infra Part II.B.2.e.
73.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text. At least one high-ranking Department of
Labor official has implied that an employer's decision to discontinue a plan investment option may be treated as an employer settlor function immune from fiduciary responsibility
under ERISA. England, supra note 8, at 73 (comments of Alan Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin.). ERISA's "anti-cutback" rule, which prohibits
the taking away of vested accrued benefits, does not apply to a 401 (k) plan's menu of in·
vestment options. See infra note 185.
71.
72.
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ers who sponsor 401 (k) plans generally use what is known as a "full
service provider" for "one-stop shopping" in establishing and ad74
ministering their 401 (k) plans. The hypothetical "Full Service
Provider" represents the mutual fund companies, large banks, and
insurance companies who offer these services. 75
The question presented to the federal court in this hypothetical
introduces the first set of broad policy choices that arise in 401 (k)
plan fiduciary litigation. On one hand, ERISA makes retirement
plan sponsorship by employers voluntary.76 Consequently, the fiduciary duties (and corresponding potential liability for breach)
imposed upon employers should not be made so burdensome that
employers will be deterred from offering retirement plans to their
77
employees. On the other hand, a principal purpose of ERISA's
fiduciary provisions is to protect the integrity of plan assets and the
78
retirement plan benefits provided to plan participants. The more
stringently these fiduciary duties are enforced, the greater the protection to plan participants. This first set of policy choices is
referred to as "employer burden versus participant protection."
Employer burden is a particularly sensitive policy concern in the
401 (k) plan context. The statistical trends show that 401 (k) plans
are quickly becoming the most prevalent type of retirement plan
79
offered by employers. Larger and more well-established employers tend to offer 401 (k) plans in addition to other types of
80
retirement plans. But smaller and newer employers tend to offer
81
only 401 (k) plans. For this latter group in particular, the only viable economic choice may be between offering employees a
82
401 (k) plan or no retirement plan at al1. Consequently, a potential policy concern is whether imposing too great of a fiduciary
burden may deter these smaller employers from offering 401 (k)
74.
PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.7 (reporting that eightyfive percent of 401 (k) plans with fewer than 250 participants and seventy-five percent of
401 (k) plans with 250 to 1,000 participants use a full senoice provider).
75.
See id.
76.
H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639, 4639; see
also In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that one of
ERISA's underlying purposes is to encourage the development of private retirement plans).
77.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
78.
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994); In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 434; H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 1
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639, 4639; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 29 (1974) reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4838, 4865.
79.
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 38, at tbl.D4.
80.
81.
Id.
82.
PAUL YAKOBOSKI ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., THE GALLUP ORG.,
INC., ISSUE BRIEF No. 212, THE 1999 SMALL EMPLOYER RETIREMENT SURVEY; BUILDING A
BETTER MOUSETRAP Is NOT ENOUGH 3 (1999) (finding that only thirty-one percent of individuals who work for employers having fewer than 100 employees have a retirement plan).
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plans to their employees, thereby leaving these employees without
a retirement plan.
A recent survey of small employers by the Employee Benefits
Research Institute attempted to discern the reasons why this particular group sponsored or refused to sponsor retirement plans for
83
their workers. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the survey
results suggest that the administrative costs associated with plan
sponsorship are not a dominant factor in the small employer's decision. 84 Rather, the two most important factors are the competitive
advantage that offering a retirement plan gave the employer in
employee recruitment and retention, and the positive effect on
85
employee attitude and performance.
This information concerning small employer behavior is important because the employer's fiduciary duty of prudence will impact
the employer's cost of plan sponsorship. The survey evidence indicates that the federal courts need not set the standard for
prudence unnecessarily low out of a fear of chilling future 401 (k)
plan sponsorship among small employers because competitive advantage, not altruism, plays the greatest role in employer's
decisions to sponsor 401 (k) plans. In the 401 (k) plan setting, prudent investigation in the beginning is relatively inexpensive,
whereas protracted fiduciary litigation (and potential employer
liability) after the fact is not. What is needed are clear guidelines from
the federal courts to the employee benefits community delineating
the employer's duty of prudence in selecting the investment op86
tions for a 401 (k) plan.
Participant protection, too, has an important policy role in the
401 (k) plan setting. A 401 (k) plan that offers employees a carefully
selected range of investment options is likely to maximize the potential for achieving retirement income security.87 At retirement, a
401 (k) plan participant's benefit will be the balance of her plan
account, much which will be attributable to the tax-deferred com88
pounding of investment earnings over a long period of time.
Consequently, the returns generated by the investment options
available to the participant under the plan will playa large role in
determining her retirement benefit. Conversely, fees and expenses
Id. at l.
Id. at 5.
85.
Id. at 6-7.
86.
SeeJacobius, supra note 9, at 6l.
87.
Lucchetti, supra note 49.
88.
See Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Emplnyer-Based Retirement Programs: Is
It "StiU" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income?, 49 TAX L. REv. 1-2 n.4 (1993); see
also JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 229-32
(3d ed. 2000).
83.
84.
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charged to the participant's account will erode significantly her
investment earnings and, ultimately, the amount of her retirement
H9
benefit.
c. Policy Analysis: Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting Investment
options-The greatest challenge facing the federal courts in 401 (k)
plan fiduciary litigation will be interpreting and applying an established body of legal precedent, the ERISA fiduciary duties, to a
new and unforeseen context. This task requires a fresh look at the
legal standards used to evaluate fiduciary conduct under ERISA.
In the discussion below, established legal standards for evaluating an employer's duty of prudence are reframed in the form of a
question. Each question represents the same basic query: How
should this legal standard apply to 401 (k) plans? Following each
question is a discussion and analysis of the competing policy considerations that the federal courts may want to consider in
determining how the established legal standard should be applied
in the 401 (k) plan context.
Should the Employer have consulted an outside expert before selecting
the 401(k) plan's mutual fund investment options? Or does the Employer have the in-house expertise to make investment selections?

Case law indicates that the duty of prudence requires an employer who lacks investment expertise to seek outside expertise
90
before investing the assets of the plan. But is there a compelling
policy reason to change this standard when the employer is selecting the investment options that will be available to 401 (k) plan
participants? The importance of the employer'S decision to the
ultimate value of the 401 (k) plan's retirement benefits is obvious. 91
But is the corresponding burden on the employer so great that it
justifies lowering the standard? Here employer size is a factor meriting consideration. In general, large employers are more likely to
have sufficient in-house investment expertise to prudently select a
range of investment options for the 401 (k) plan. Consequently,
the real impact of the duty is most likely to fall on smaller employers.
A Department of Labor industry advisory group (Working
Group) has indicated that the first question a plan fiduciary should
ask itself when selecting a service provider is, "What service or

89.
90.
91.

See infra pp. 492-95, 503 and notes 104, 15l.
See supra note 63.
See supra note 88.
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expertise does the plan need?,,92 The real problem, hinted at by the
first hypothetical, is that many employers, but particularly small
93
employers, are heavily reliant on their 401 (k) service providers.
This practice underlies a significant, yet unanswered, policy
question: Should a "suggestion" of investment options made by a
representative of the service provider satisfy the Employer's fiduciary duty to
seek outside expertise? The Department of Labor's Working Group
does not address this question. Analysis of this policy question at
this juncture is premature, as several additional factors must first
be considered.
Should the Employer have considered and compared· various Full
Service Providers before reaching a decision?

Common sense dictates that the employer consider and compare two or more service providers before settling on one to assist
the employer in servicing the 401 (k) plan and, more importantly,
furnishing the plan's investment options. Mter all, in handling
their own affairs, people generally do not buy the first car they see,
nor the first house they are shown. They shop, they compare, and
then they choose. Selecting a service provider for a 401 (k) plan is a
fiduciary function,94 historically subject to '" [n] ot honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, ... [as] the stan. , ,,95
d ar d 0 f b e h aVlOr.
Yet the Department of Labor's Working Group found that
[m]any of the problems with respect to service providers arise
because the responsible plan fiduciary either does not understand his role and responsibility in the selection and
monitoring of service providers or exercises poor judgment
because he does not have experience or an appropriate
source of information concerning legal requirements and in96
.
d ustry practIces.
This finding, made by the Working Group in 1996, appears to
be primarily directed at problems arising in the context of single92.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT PUNS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, REpORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GUIDANCE IN SELECTING AND MONITORING
SERVICE PROVIDERS § V.A.1 (1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/
adcoun/srvpro.htm (last visited May 7, 2001) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL].
93.
See supra note 74.
94.
ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § III.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.s. 211, 224 (2000) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
95.
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928».
96.
ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § III.
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97

employer defined benefit plans. Since that time, however, the
regulations indicate that this basic fiduciary responsibility also applies in the context of selecting and monitoring the service
98
provider for a 401 (k) plan.
Did the Employer consider and compare the historical rates of return
offered by various investment options? Their volatility? Their liquidity? The fees and expenses charged by the Full Service Provider to plan
participants? Does the overall ''package'' of investment options offered
by the plan offer a participant the ability to construct a diversified
portfolio?

Requiring the employer to evaluate such factors as historical
rates of return, liquidity, and volatility in selecting investment options is not as burdensome as it may first appear. The 404(c)
Regulations in effect require the employer to consider these fac99
tors. This information is readily available, if requested, from the
service provider who will provide the investment options for the
1oo
401 (k) plan. The employer, however, may not have the investment expertise to analyze prudently this information.
In contrast, information concerning the fees and expenses
charged to the plan participants may prove difficult to obtain and
even more difficult to analyze and compare. The Department of
Labor's Working Group recommends that a plan fiduciary ask the
following question when selecting a service provider: "Are the service provider's fees reasonable when compared to industry
standards in view of the services to be performed, the provider's
qualifications and the scope of the service provider's responsibility?,,101 Yet a 1998 Department of Labor study of 401 (k) plan fees
and expenses found that obtaining such information is difficult.
The costs of 401 (k) plan services are somewhat dependent
on the information that a plan sponsor has about the range of
prices in the marketplace that are charged by these providers.
A search of the literature shows that gaining visibility of the
universe of thousands of service providers would be difficult
to impossible for any plan sponsor with limited resources. For
example, Valletta (February 1997) estimates that there are in

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

[d.
29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (e) (2000).
See infra Part II.B.3.h.
See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 8.
ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 92, § V.A.4.
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excess of 1500 third party administrators and over 3,000 firms
offering asset management services to 401 (k) plans.
The directories cited offer only a small segment of the available vendors, although the majority of the larger providers
are displayed. For example, the 401(k) Provider Directory, one
of the best known, only contains information about 94 of the
larger full service providers (HR Investment Consultants).
The other directory located in the literature search, the
(k)form Catalog, contains information about both full service
providers as well as TPAs [third party administrators] and alliances. However, the (k)form Catalog lists only 79 such
providers. (The publisher states that these 79 providers service over 50% of 401 (k) plans in the country.)
Information about service providers is also available from associations, advertising, and the Internet. In addition, the
401 (k) plan provider industry is very aggressively seeking to
make their services known, frequently through well structured
sales networks. However, the plan sponsor relying solely on
information furnished by those service providers that establish contact through a sales force, would have incomplete
knowledge of the marketplace.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the market for
401 (k) plan services is not particularly efficient for the plans
that do not have the resources or interest to search for information that would allow a comparison of available services
.
102
an d pnces.
Although obtaining comparable data on fees and expenses is
burdensome to the employer, the need to protect plan participants
may be even greater. The Department of Labor's 1998 study found
that "a substantial portion of 401 (k) plan fees and expenses are
charged against the account balances of plan participants and that
this trend is increasing.,,103 The study described the implications of
this trend as follows:

102. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 2.7.4; see also id. § 3.7
(discussing whether plan sponsors and participants are adequately infonned about fees and
expenses); Terry R. O'Neill, It Pays to Knaw About Both Qualified and Nonqualified Programs,
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Apr. 1,2000, at 41,42 (describing when 401(k) plan fees
may be hidden); Stephen B. Whipple, 401(k): Savings Plan or SheU Game?, A.B.A. BANKING J.,
Apr. 1,2000, at 79,79 (same).
103. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, §§ I, 3.6.
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Expenses of operating and maintaining an investment portfolio that are debited against the participant's account
constitute an opportunity cost in the form of foregone investments in every contribution period. The laws of
compound interest dictate that these small reductions in investment are magnified greatly over the decades in which
many employees will be 401 (k) plan participants. Observers
have concluded that some plan providers are charging as
much as 100 basis points in fees and expenses over the prevailing average rates (citation omitted). The effect of such
higher levels of expenses would be to reduce the value of potential future account balances for these participants.

An example in Forbes Magazine shows this effect. Two employees each contribute the same amount annually into
mutual funds. The funds each return 9% annually, but one
has an expense ratio of 0.2% while the other has an expense
ratio of 1.2%, a difference of 100 basis points. At the end of
35 years, the less expensive fund has a balance 23% higher
than the other (citation omitted).
Some observers postulate that some plans are paying fees
and expenses that are too high. Evidence for this conclusion
is offered by studies that show extraordinary variance in price
quotations given by providers for essentially comparable services (citations omitted). It has been argued by these observers
that, when a plan incurs higher fees and expenses, the plan
sponsor has not exercised adequate care in selecting and
monitoring the plan's service providers.
A second issue of concern to many observers is that sponsors
(and participants) lack adequate information on the structure
and extent of fees and expenses to make informed choices
about service providers and investment options. Thus, the inadequate disclosure of information may be a factor in the
existence of the large variance in fees and expenses of 401 (k)
104
I
pans.
The Department of Labor study found that the single largest
type of expense being charged to 401 (k) plan participants was in10'
vestment management fees. ' Investment management fees are
104.
105.

Id. § I.
Id. § 3.3.4.
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deducted at the mutual fund level to compensate the service pro106
vider for managing the assets held in the mutual fund. The study
found that investment management fees exceed eighty percent of
107
a typical 401 (k) plan's total fees and expenses.
The potential for mischief when an employer relies on a service
provider representative for expert advice in selecting plan investment options should now be evident. Although the Securities and
Exchange Commission requires disclosure of investment management fees/OS such disclosure may be meaningless to an employer.
Are the fees high, average, or low for the industry? The service
provider representative may know the answer to this question, but
it may not be in the representative's self-interest (or the interest of
the representative's employer, the service provider) to opine on
the subject. If fees are disclosed as relatively high, the service prog
vider may lose a customer, and the representative may lose a sale.lO
Does this mean that 401 (k) plan participants should go unprotected? Can the burden on the employer to investigate fees and
expenses be mitigated? The answer to both of these questions lies
in full disclosure of industry standards for 401 (k) plan fees and
expenses. Today's employer does not need to investigate independently industry standards for fees and expenses, since the
Department of Labor compiled and posted this information on the
•
110 as h ave 0 t h
l'
11y one
Internet,
er·Ind epen d ent sources. 111 W·th
lItera
click, the employer can evaluate whether the fees and expenses of
the service provider are "low," "high," or "average" when compared to industry standards. In addition, the Department of Labor
developed a standardized questionnaire to assist employers in making meaningful comparisons of the fees and expenses charged by
1I2
various 401 (k) plan service providers.

106. Id. Due to ERISA's complex prohibited transaction rules, receipt of these investment management fees prevents the plan service provider from providing investment
advice to the 401 (k) plan participants. See generally Medill, supra note 22, at 38-46
(discussing ERISA's prohibited transaction rules and exemptions).
107. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 3.3.4.
108. Id. § 2.4.1.1; Medill, supra note 22, at 44-46 and accompanying notes.
109. Indeed, the founder and former chief executive officer of Vanguard Group has
criticized publicly the greed, in the form of higher fees, that has invaded the mutual fund
industry. John C. Bogle, How Mutual Funds Lost Their Way, WALL ST. j., June 20, 2000, at
A26.
110. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 4.2-.3.
Ill. E.g., Sue Stevens, So What IS a Reasonable Fee?, THE 401 (K) WIRE, June 7, 2000, at
http://www.401kWire.com (summarizing data compiled using Morningstar software) (last
visited May 7,2001) (on file with author).
112. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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Service provider fees and expenses charged that border on the
abusive are now a Department of Labor enforcement priority."3
The federal courts should consider the growing availability of this
information in determining whether an employer has acted prudently.
Did the Employer periodically review the plan '5 investment options to
determine if they should continue to be offered or instead should be
changed?

The Department of Labor's position is that the employer has an
ongoing fiduciary duty to monitor the investment options offered
under the 401 (k) plan.
[T]he Department points out that the act of limiting or designating investment options which are intended to constitute
all or part of the investment universe of an ERISA 404(c) plan
is a fiduciary function which, whether achieved through fiduciary designation or express plan language, is not a direct or
necessary result of any participant direction of such plan. Thus,
for example, in the case of look-through investment vehicles
[mutual funds], the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to
prudently select such vehicles, as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically evaluate the peiformance of such vehicles to
determine, based upon that evaluation, whether the vehicles should continue to be available as participant investment options. 114
There are sound policy reasons underlying this duty to monitor
the plan's investment options. As John Bogle, founder and former
chief executive officer of Vanguard Group observes:
During the 1990s, 55% of equity funds failed, almost four
times the 14% failure rate of the 1960s. Should the recent
failure rate hold, 2,500 of today's 4,500 equity funds won't be
around in 2010. 115
The employer's fiduciary duty to periodically review the 401 (k)
plan's investment options raises the hidden policy question posed
113. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
114. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1) (emphasis
added).
115. Bogle, supra note 109. Insurance companies, too, are subject to failure. See supra
note 59 discussing In re Unisys.
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at the beginning of this section. If an employer lacks the expertise
to evaluate a plan's investment options, is it prudent for the employer to rely on the service provider's sales representative for such
expertise? By now it should be apparent why such reliance may
well be imprudent during either the initial selection or a periodic
review of the plan's investment options. The service provider's financial interests in obtaining and retaining the employer's 401 (k)
plan business are in direct financial conflict with its interest in providing a candid analysis of the performance of the service
provider's investment options. Employers cannot prudently rely on
a service provider's opinion of its mutual funds performance or
the competitiveness of its fees and expenses. ERISA's duty of prudence should require the employer either to use its own in-house
expertise to make this evaluation or to seek the assistance of an
unbiased outside expert.
d. Policy Choices: The Employee Ownership Dilemma-The second
hypothetical introduces another set of policy choices that federal
courts are likely to confront in 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation.
These policy issues arise when the employer includes company
stock as an investment option in its 401 (k) plan. Here, the underlying potential conflicts of interest stem not from the plan's service
provider, but from the employer itself.

SECOND HYPOTHETICAL

Employer decides that, in addition to selecting seven mutual funds as
investment options for its 401(k) plan, it will also include as an investment option its own publicly traded stock. The question presented
to the federal court is whether Employer has satisfied its fiduciary duty
of prudence by selecting company stock as an investment option.

The "employee ownership dilemma" is introduced by the second hypothetical. In this instance, the dilemma is not whether to
encourage employee ownership as a matter of national economic
policy; rather, it is whether, as a matter of national retirement policy,
we want to use tax-favored 401 (k) plans as a vehicle to promote
employee ownership.
The traditional retirement plan vehicle used for promoting employee ownership is the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP).116
116. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST., supra note 3, at 103-10; see also I.R.C. § 409
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (as amended in 1979).
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ERISA expressly exempts ESOPs from both the duty of prudence
as it relates to plan investments in qualifYing employer securities 1l7
and the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets. liB These exemptions are necessary because the assets of the ESOP must be
invested primarily in employer securities for it to qualify for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. The policy
justifications for ESOPs, however, are not applicable to 401 (k)
119
pans.
I
ESOPs can hold stock of a company that is not traded on a
12o
national securities exchange. Thus, ESOPs offer employees of
privately held companies, who otherwise would not be able to
purchase company stock, a unique opportunity to share in the
ownership of their employer. By contrast, the requirements of the
404(c) Regulations mandate that 401 (k) plans hold only company
121
stock that is publicly traded on a national market. Thus, a 401 (k)
plan with company stock as an investment option cannot be
justified on the ground that it offers employees the sole
opportunity to share in the ownership of their employer because
the stock can be purchased outside the company 401 (k) plan.
Rather, the employee ownership dilemma presented by 401 (k)
plans is whether, as a matter of national retirement policy, the
purchase of publicly traded company stock by employees should
be encouraged through the use of pre-tax dollars contributed to a
401 (k) plan.
ERISA's statutory language provides mixed signals as to how the
federal courts should approach the employer's selection of company stock as an investment option for 401 (k) plans. ERISA section
404(a) (2) provides:
In the case of an eligible individual account plan,122 the ...
prudence requirement (only to the extent it requzres
ll7. 29 U.S.C. § ll04(a) (2) (1994).
ll8. [d. § 1107(d)(3)-(d) (4).
ll9. See LR.C. § 409(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (b).
120. Compare LR.C. § 409(a}(2), with 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4)(iii)
(2000).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii)(E)( 4) (iii).
122. An "eligible individual account plan" is defined in ERISA section 407(d)(3) to
include profit sharing, stock bonus, thrift, savings, employee stock ownership, and certain
money purchase plans. 29 U.S.C. § ll07(d) (3) (1994). This definition includes a 401(k)
plan. See id. The prohibited transaction rules of ERISA section 407, however, may restrict
the value of employer qualifying securities attributable to elective deferrals to not more
than ten percent of the value of all plan assets attributable to elective deferrals if certain
criteria are met. [d. § 1l07(a)(2). These criteria are threefold: (1) a portion of the plan's
elective deferrals or earnings thereon are required to be invested in qualifying employer
securities under the terms or the plan or at the direction of someone other than the
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diversification) ... is not violated by acquisition or holding of
.. 123.... 124
... qualifyi' ng emp Ioyer secuntIes
Section 404(a) (2) can be read as creating a "strong policy and
preference in favor of investment in employer stock.,,125 Yet the
language of the statute clearly eliminates only one factordiversification-from consideration in evaluating the employer's
126
compliance with the duty of prudence. Other factors relevant to
whether the employer has satisfied its duty of prudence remain. 127
Perhaps the name of the legislation itself is instructive: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 128 There is compelling
evidence that encouraging company stock as an investment option
in 401 (k) plans is unlikely to promote income security during re129
tirement. While a few lucky employees will be big winners, many
others will be big losers. 13o
The potential investment risk presented by company stock argues for a relatively high standard of prudence for employers who
choose to include their own stock as a 401 (k) plan investment op131
tion. From the perspective of protecting plan participants, the
policy argument in favor of close scrutiny is reinforced by the absence of federal insurance in the event of employer insolvency.132 If
the employer fails, so does the participant's 401 (k) plan investment in company stock.
participant; (2) the portion of elective deferrals required to be invested in qualifying
employer securities exceeds one percent of the employee's compensation used to
determine the employee's maximum allowable elective deferrals under the plan for the
year; and (3) the fair market value of all individual account plans (defined in ERISA Section
407(d) (3» maintained by the employer exceeds ten percent of the fair market value of the
assets of all pension plans (excluding multi-employer plans) maintained by the employer.
29 U.S.C. §§ l107(a)(1)-(2),(b).
123. "Qualifying employer securities" generally include company stock publicly traded
on a national exchange or other generally recognized market. 29 U.S.C. § 1l07(d) (5).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added) (statutory cross-references omitted).
125. Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Burud
v. Acme Elec., 591 F. Supp. 238, 248 (D. Alaska 1984».
126. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1978).
127. See infra Part II.B.l.e.
128. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1,88 Stat. 829, 829 (1974).
129. See supra note 52.
130. [d.
131. See Fink v. Nat'l Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The investment decisions of a profit sharing plan's fiduciary are subject to the closest scrutiny
under the prudent person rule, in spite of the 'strong policy and preference in favor of
investment in employer stock.' .. (internal citations omitted»; Eaves, 587 F.2d at 459-60.
132. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation provides insurance for retirement
plan benefits only for defined benefit plans, not 401 (k) plans. A.B.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
COMM., supra note 12, at 362-63. This government insurance program is contained in Title
IV of ERISA. [d. at 364.
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e. Policy Analysis: Employer's Duty of Prudence in Selecting Company
Stock as an Investment option-The same list of questions presented
after the first hypothetical generally are applicable to the second
I33
hypothetical. Seeking outside expertise becomes easier to resolve.
Obviously, the employer is qualified to evaluate the substantive
merits of including its own stock as an investment option. Because
the company stock must be publicly traded,134 the need to make
policy distinctions based upon employer size is reduced.
Rate of return, volatility, and liquidity concerns become more
prominent in the context of company stock. Employers who have
recently "gone public" have no basis on which to evaluate these
factors. Liquidity in particular becomes a concern in the event that
a company is "delisted" from a national exchange or other market
ls5
system for failure to meet market capitalization standards.
Diversification technically cannot be considered when the emIS6
ployer selects its own stock as an investment option. It is difficult,
however, to ignore the growing number of studies of participant
investment choices in 401 (k) plans, which indicate that when
company stock is offered as an investment option participants tend
to invest most heavily in company stock, over other more broadls7
based investments in the equity markets.
Finally, given the absence of government insurance in the event
of employer insolvency,IS8 a periodic review of continued suitability becomes more important for the protection of plan participants.
Unfortunately, such protection also becomes more difficult. As a
practical matter, the employer's stock is likely to become
"unsuitable" only if the company is in financial distress. Until this
material information becomes public, however, the employer's
conduct concerning company stock held in the 401 (k) plan (and
disclosure of information to its own employees) is constrained by
ls9
federal securities laws. Once the company's financial distress becomes public information, as a practical matter, it will be too late

133. See supra pp. 486-87, 489-91, 495.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d) (2) (ii) (E) (4) (iii) (2000).
135. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 8 (2000), available at http://www.nyse.com (last visited May 7, 2001); NASDAQ
LISTING REQUIREMENTS AND FEES (2001), available at http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited
May 7, 2001).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994).
137. See supra note 5l.
138. See supra note 132.
139. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994); Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (2000). See generally RALPH C.
FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL (1999) (treatise on insider
trading law).
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for many employees to minimize their investment losses from their
company stock holdings in the 401 (k) plan. Assuming an efficient
equities market, the value of the stock will almost instantaneously
have plummeted, and along with it, the value of the participant's
retirement benefit. 141l
2. The Employer's Duty oj Loyalty in Selecting 401(k) Plan Investment
options
a. Established Legal Standards-ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A) requires an employer to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.,,141 Lawmakers intended the federal courts to
interpret this standard, like the duty of prudence, in light of the
'
I
142
· purposes 0 fretIrement
po I ICY
pans.
The federal courts generally have viewed this standard as incorporating the common law duty of undivided loyalty expected of
143
trustees under the common law of trusts. As one leading treatise
states, "[d]ealingwith the plan assets in order to further one's own
interests rather than those of the plan clearly violates the ...
rule."I44 Like the duty of prudence, however, the duty of loyalty invokes some degree of flexibility, and thus, judicial discretion, in
application. Although an employer must discharge its fiduciary
duties "with an eye single to the interests of the participants and
beneficiaries,,,145 some federal courts have ruled that an employer's
actions may also provide benefit "incidentally" to itself. 146 This incidental benefit to an employer is not necessarily a breach of the
duty of loyalty if the employer has conducted a prudent inquiry
and has determined reasonably that its decision is in the best in140. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent fair disclosure regulation, effective October 23, 2000, is designed to eliminate the practice of selective disclosure and,
thereby, level the playing field between individual and institutional investors. Regulation FD
(fair disclosure) is likely to reduce the informational advantage that securities analysts and
institutional investors who trade in large blocks of a company's stock previously have enjoyed over individual 401 (k) plan investors. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249),
available at http://www.sec.gov (last visited May 7, 2001).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(l) (A).
142. See supra note 58.
143. E.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1984); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d
453,457 (lOth Cir. 1978); Freund v. Marshall & I1sley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 639 (W.D.
Wis. 1979).
144. AB.A. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at 273.
145. Donovan v. BielWirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir. 1982).
146. Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987); Donovan v. Walton,
609 F. Supp. 1221, 1244-46 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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147

terests of plan participants. Thus, even though the employer's
duty of prudence technically is separate from the employer's duty
of loyalty, an employer's lack of prudence may also be a factor in
determining whether a breach of the duty of loyalty occurred.

b. Policy Choices: The Incidental Benefit Question-In the 401 (k)
plan setting, multiple scenarios raise potential duty of loyalty issues. Again, these scenarios arise when the employer selects the
investment options for the 401 (k) plan. Under each, the policy
dilemma for the federal courts will be to draw a line separating
permitted "incidental" employer benefits from prohibited selfdealing. This third set of policy choices is the "incidental benefit
question."
The duty of loyalty scenarios discussed below distinguish between general and specialized situations. Thus, the first generation
of 401 (k) plan litigation currently before the federal courts involves very large employers, with equally large public allegations of
148
employer self-dealing using 401 (k) plan assets. Although these
cases garnered attention in the financial press, they involve a relatively narrow population of employers and a specialized set of facts.
Less noticed, but potentially much more significant from the
perspective of national retirement policy, is the subtle abuse of
401 (k) plan assets that every employer, large or small, can engage in when selecting investment options for its 401 (k) plan.
This abuse occurs when the employer attempts to reduce its cost
of 401 (k) plan sponsorship by allowing the service provider to
charge higher fees and expenses to the participants in the 401 (k)
plan as a quid pro quo for lower administrative fees charged to the
149
empI oyer.
If left unchallenged, this subtle abuse is likely to have a major
impact on the retirement income security of millions of 401 (k)
plan participants. The Department of Labor actively campaigns
against this practice by sensitizing both employers and employees
15o
to the issue. In the discussion of duty of loyalty scenarios below,
this subtle abuse scenario is presented first because of its

147. Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1997); Schaefer v. Ark. Med. Soc'y,
853 F.2d 1487, 1492 (8th Cir. 1988); Leigh, 727 F.2d at 125-26; Bierwirth, 680 F.2d at 271;
Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121, 1128-29 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F. Supp. 1174, 1212-13 (C.D. Ill. 1985); Walton, 609 F. Supp. at 1245. But see
Schwartz v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that conflicts of interest made it impossible for corporate officers who also served as plan fiduciaries
to satisfy ERISA's duty of loyalty).
148. See supra notes 7-8.
149. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
150. See supra note 45.
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widespread and significant implications for national retirement
policy. More specialized litigation scenarios follow.
c. Policy Analysis: The Fees for Costs Loyalty Scenario-The third
hypothetical introduces the incidental benefit question that potentially arises when any employer selects investment options for its
401 (k) plan.

THIRD HYPOTHETICAL

Employer decides to establish a participant directed 401(k) plan. Employer approaches two Full Service Providers of 401(k) plans. Each
Full Service Provider offers a convenient 401 (k) plan ''package'' consisting of all necessary plan documents, administrative services, and
plan investment options.

There are two possibilities:
First, Full Service Provider, a Bank, offers its own proprietary mutual
funds as 401(k) plan investment options. The Bank's mutual funds
charge a "load" fee (sales commission) of 2. 0 % to the plan participants. In addition, the Bank's mutual funds have an annual
management fee (paid to the Bank's sister corporation) equivalent to
2.0% of fund assets. If the Employer's 401(k) plan uses only the
Bank's mutual funds as its investment options, the Bank will charge
the Employer an annual Jee of $500 Jor plan administrative services.
Second, Full Service Provider, a Brokerage Company, offers a wide
variety of mutual Junds offered by a number of national mutual Jund
companies as potential investment options Jor the Employer's 401(k)
plan. These Junds vary in the load and management Jees they charge.
Many oj these options carry no load Jee and deduct an annual management fee equivalent to 1.0% of Jund assets. The Brokerage
Company allied itself with an outside vendor who provides plan administrative services Jor 401 (k) plan customers oj the Brokerage
Company. The Brokerage Company will charge the Employer an annual fee of $2,500 Jor plan administrative services.
The Employer selects the 401(k) plan package offered by the Bank.
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer has
satisfied its fiduciary duty oj loyalty in selecting the Bank's proprietary mutual Junds as the investment options Jor the 401 (k) plan.
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The policy issue implicit in the third hypothetical is the incidental benefit question. Has the employer received a permissible
incidental benefit of lower plan costs by selecting the higher-fee
service provider, or has the employer breached its duty of loyalty
by failing to act solely in the interests of the plan's participants?
The answer to this question will have a significant impact on the
retirement benefits received by the 401 (k) plan participants.
Fees and expenses charged to 401 (k) plan participants over time
can erode dramatically the value of their retirement benefits. The
Department of Labor furnishes the following example of the corrosive effect of plan fees and expenses:
Assume that you are an employee with 35 years until retirement and a current 401 (k) account balance of $25,000. If
returns on investments in your account over the next 35 years
average 7 percent and fees and expenses reduce your average
returns by 0.5 percent, your account balance will grow to
$227,000 at retirement, even if there are no further contributions to your account. If fees and expenses are 1.5 percent,
however, your account balance will grow to only $163,000.
The 1 percent difference in fees and expenses would reduce
151
your account balance at retirement by 28 percent.
The Department of Labor made abusive fee practices by 401 (k)
152
plan service providers a national investigative priority for 2000.
This enforcement priority, however, was aimed at the egregious
fee practices of plan service providers, not of employers. 153
The Department of Labor's 1998 study of 401 (k) plan fees and
expenses found that service providers routinely offer below cost
plan administrative services to employers in exchange for higher
l54
asset management fees that are usually charged to the plan's par155
ticipants. The growing trend toward shifting the costs of plan
sponsorship to participants means that the incidental benefit ques156
tion will likely grow in importance in the future.
151. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 1.
152. Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin.; Strategic Enforcement Plan, 65 Fed. Reg.
18,208, 18,210 (Apr. 6, 2000); DOL Strategic Enforcement Plan, TRUST LETTER, May 1, 2000, at
6.
153. See supra note 152.
154. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, § 3.3.1-.2.
155. [d. §§ I, 3.6, 5.3.2.
156. See id. § 3.7 ("ERISA charges ... plan sponsors with a fiduciary responsibility to act
in the best interests of the plan participants. This implies that plan sponsors will know the
costs of the services they procure and will apply due diligence to minimize these costs in the
light of the level of services desired.").
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The incidental benefit question in the plan fees and expenses
context intersects the more profound policy dilemma of employer
burden versus participant protection. Here again, the federal
courts should be aware of the distinctions between large and small
employers. Large employers controlling 401 (k) plans with sizable
assets have market bargaining power-.157 Service providers compete
fiercely for their business and are willing to discount fees and expenses accordingly.15B Small employers with 401 (k) plans of
159
comparably small asset size lack such bargaining leverage. They
tend to be limited in their investment options to so-called "retail
mutual funds," which have the highest investment management
c
J.ees. lfiO
The technical evidentiary burden presented by the incidental
benefit question is how to ascertain the motives of an employer
who selects a higher fee service provider. Absent the proverbial
smoking gun, evidence of an employer's motives will necessarily be
circumstantial and will most likely overlap with evidence of the
161
employer's procedural and substantive pmdence.
The employer's procedural prudence involves questions regarding its decisionmaking process, and perhaps most importantly,
162
documentation of that process. How many service providers did
the employer consider, and did the employer attempt a comparative analysis of their fees and expenses? In the past, requiring this
type of comparative analysis arguably could have imposed an un163
due burden on employers. Today, the potential for a chilling
effect on plan sponsorship is much less likely because the Departl64
ment of Labor has issued a series of questions and a standardized
form for employers to use in comparing the fees and expenses of
potential plan service providers,165 developed with various representatives of the service provider industry. 166 Consequently, a
service provider's refusal to cooperate in supplying this information in itself should be a red flag to the employer.
157. [d. §§ 3.5.1, IV; Schultz & Brown, supra note 8.
158. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 37, §§ 2.4.1.3, IV.
159. [d. §§ 3.7 ("smaller plans do not benefit from this price competition"), IV.
160. [d. § 2.4.1.1-.3.
16l. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
162. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
164. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 6.
165. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ABC PLAN 401 (K)
PLAN FEE DISCLOSURE FORM, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001)
(on file with author).
166. Press Release, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, Labor Secretary
Herman Announces New Disclosure Information on 401 (k) Fees (July IS, 1999), availabk at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba (last visited May 7, 2001).
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Paperwork alone, however, cannot be relied upon as conclusive
proof of the employer's loyal motives in selecting the investment
options for its 401 (k) plan. There must be some objective way to
evaluate the substantive prudence of the employer's decision, otherwise the employer's duty of loyalty can be too easily
circumvented by the subterfuge of savvy documentation.
The employer'S substantive prudence can be evaluated by comparing the plan'S fees and expenses with the published industry
averages for 401 (k) plans of similarly sized assets and participant
167
numbers. This industry measure of substantive prudence should
be tempered, however, by a qualitative examination of the services
being provided by the employer's selected provider. Cheaper is
not always better.
Ultimately, where do these competing policy considerations
lead the federal courts who must deal with the incidental benefit
question? Employers naturally would prefer a bright line test that
promotes certainty in determining their fiduciary responsibilities.
Such a bright line rule, however, is likely to prove rigid and
inflexible. In the alternative, a flexible multi-factor test based on
the facts and circumstances will create uncertainty for employers,
but is likely to lead to better policy.
l68
The 401 (k) plan services industry is highly competitive. A
multi-factor test will focus this competition and, consequently,
promote lower fees and expenses. In contrast, a bright line rule
proclaiming that a specified amount or formula for fees and expenses is "prudent" may codifY today's historically high levels of
169
401 (k) plan fees and expenses. Perhaps more importantly, experts in the employee benefits community are just beginning to
examine what constitutes prudent practice for employers who
sponsor 401 (k) plans. For example, some employee benefits experts suggest that employers develop and use an investment policy
to guide their selection and monitoring of 401 (k) plan investment
170
options. Few employers currently have investment policies for
l7l
their 401 (k) plans. In ten years, however, such an investment
policy may have evolved into a norm for employer prudence. A
multi-factor test would encourage this evolution. When the law is
uncertain, employers (and the ERISA experts who counsel them)

167. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
168. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 45, § 1.
169. See Bogle, supra note 109.
170. Banham, supra note 8, at 75; Carolyn Hirschman, 40J(k)s Need Investment Policies,
Too, HRMAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1999, at 100.
171. Hirschman, supra note 170.
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naturally tend to err on the side of caution. Such caution is likely
to inure to the greater protection of 401 (k) plan participants.
d. Policy Analysis: The Shop Only at the Company Store Loyalty Scenario-The "shop only at the company store" scenario is limited to
employers who are themselves service providers to 401 (k) plans.
The fourth hypothetical below illustrates a typical fact pattern.

FOURTH HYPOTHETICAL

Employer is a Full Service Provider with its own line of proprietary
mutual funds. Employer acquires another company, which becomes a
Subsidiary of Employer. Employer merges the pre-existing 401(k) plan
of the Subsidiary into Employer's 401(k) plan. Employer substitutes
its own proprietary mutual funds for the investment options previously offered under the Subsidiary's 401 (k) plan. The question
presented to the federal court is whether the Employer has satisfied its
fiduciary duty of loyalty in selecting its own line of proprietary mutual funds as investment options for the 401 (k) plan.

The practice by employers in the financial services industry of
using their own mutual funds for the retirement plans of their
172
employees predates ERISA. Mter ERISA was enacted, it appeared
that this practice violated ERISA's prohibited transaction rules.I73
Responding to industry requests, in 1977, the Department of Labor issued an administrative exemption that allowed this practice
to continue free of ERISA's prohibited transaction rules. I74 As a
result, this practice continues to be widespread among employers
in the financial services industry.175
With respect to ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions,
however, the Department of Labor's position is that the prohibited
172. Proposed Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,080,
54,081 (Dec. 10, 1976).
173. Id.
174. Final Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,734, 18,734 (Apr.
8,1977); DONALD]' MEYERS & MICHAEL B. RICHMAN, ERISA CLASS EXEMPTIONS 79-91 (2d
ed. 1996 & Supp. 2000). Adoption of Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3 placed
in-house plans of mutual fund companies on the same footing as in-house plans of banks
and insurance companies. Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption 77-3, 41 Fed. Reg. at
54,080; MEYERS & RICHMAN, supra, at 79. In-house plans of banks and insurance companies
are statutorily exempted from the prohibited transaction rules. 29 U.S.C. § 1l08(b) (4)(A)(5)(A) (1994).
175. Jacobius, 401(k) Precedent?, sUfrra note 9; Arleen Jacobius, Seroice Praviders Aren't
Concerned, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 1999, at 61 [hereinafter Jacobius, Seroice
ProvidersJ.
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transaction exemption does not exempt an employer from its
fiduciary duties under ERISA section 404(a) .176 The first
generation of 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation has produced two
types of factual allegations involving an employer's breach of the
duty of loyalty. The first type of allegation involves a service
provider who charges higher 401 (k) plan fees and expenses to its
177
own employees than to its 401 (k) plan customers. The second
type of allegation involves a service provider who has, by industry
standards, a relatively small amount of investment assets under
178
management. To make its investment vehicles more attractive to
large institutional players in the retirement plan market, the
service provider needs to increase the size of its investment assets
179
under management. By limiting employee 401 (k) investment
options to the service provider's proprietary investment vehicles,
the service provider can quickly increase the size of its investment
products and, in the process, attract business from outside
•
180
Investors.
Both types of factual allegations squarely raise the incidental
benefit question. Again, the difficult evidentiary issue is to ascertain the employer's motives in selecting its own products as
investment options for its employees' 401 (k) plan. Here, a useful
objective standard to add to the multi-factor test suggested previouslyl81 is to compare the employer's practices with those of other
service providers in the industry.182 The focus of this comparison
should not be whether the employer has conformed to the industry's lowest common denominator. This approach will only
176. Office of Pensions & Welfare Benefits, Dep't of Labor, Op. Ltr. 98-06A Ouly 30,
1998) (cautioning against using 401 (k) plan assets as "seed money" for an employer's mu·
tual funds).
177. See generally Demby, supra note 8 (discussing allegations that First Union Corporation violated its fiduciary duty in handling pension plan assets associated with its acquisition
of Signet Bank); England, supra note 8 (same). The bulk of these fees are attributable to
investment management fees generated when the service provider's employees invest their
401 (k) plan money in the employer's proprietary investment vehicles, which in tum generate income for the service provider. Demby, supra note 8.
178. See generally Demby, supra note 8 (discussing allegations that First Union Corporation violated its fiduciary duty in handling pension plan assets associated with its acquisition
of Signet Bank); England, supra note 8 (same).
179. See Demby, supra note 8, at 74.
180. See id.
181. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
182. The practices of other leading service providers in the industry indicate that a
higher standard of loyalty to the employer's own employees certainly is possible. For example, Vanguard offers only its own mutual funds as investment options for its own employees'
401 (k) plan, but offers these funds "at cost." Jacobius, Service Providers, supra note 175. Merrill Lynch offers sixty-four investment options to its employees, of which six are outside
(non-proprietary) funds. [d.
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fossilize low industry standards. Rather, the federal courts should
focus on those service providers whose practices in administering
401 (k) plans for their own employees are the most favorable, in
terms of fees, expenses, and investment option flexibility, to their
employees. Such an approach is likely to provide greater insight
into the employer's motives. It forces the employer to articulate
and justify why it cannot adopt the same favorable practices as its
competitors in the industry. In the long run, this inquiry will promote the evolution of more effective fiduciary standards for those
401 (k) plan participants who must shop only at the company store.
e. Policy Analysis: Company Stock Loyalty Scenarios in Mergers and
Acquisitions---Company stock scenarios involve publicly traded
companies who include their own stock as an investment option in
their 401 (k) plans. There are numerous scenarios in which company stock held in a 401 (k) plan could generate claims that the
employer has breached its duty of loyalty. Company stock held in a
401 (k) plan sets the stage for potential conflicts of interest between the employer's corporate fiduciary duty to its shareholders
and its ERISA fiduciary duty to 401 (k) plan participants. Inclusion
of company stock as an investment option creates the potential for
undue influence by the employer when participants' votes are
weighted according to their ownership of company stock. These
voting matters may include corporate governance, such as the election of directors, or the approval of tender offers or mergers.
Finally, the inclusion of company stock in the employer's 401 (k)
plan can raise incidental benefit questions. The fifth hypothetical
below presents an example in which these considerations become
intertwined. 183

FIFTH HYPOTHETICAL

Employer A sponsors a 401(k) plan that includes Employer A s company stock as an investment option. Employer A spins off one of its
subsidiary companies into a new public company, Company C. As a
result, participants in the Employer A 401(k) plan who originally
held Employer A company stock now also hold stock of Company C.

183. Although on the surface this hypothetical may appear to be unrealistic, it is not.
The fifth hypothetical is loosely based on the plaintiffs' allegations in Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. CV-00-04139, AHM(MANx) (C.D. Cal. filed April 18, 2000, amended
Nov. 6, 2000), available at http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
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Later, Employer A merges into Employer B. The Employer A's 401 (k)
plan is merged into Employer B's 401(k) plan. Employer B's 401(k)
plan has Employer B company stock as an investment option. Company C is a direct competitor of Employer B. Employer B liquidates the
Company C stock holdings of the former Employer A 401 (k) plan participants, and invests the proceeds in company stock of their new
Employer B.
Employer B justifies the liquidation of the Company C stock on the
ground that its 401(k) plan should not encourage its employees to
promote the success of a business competitor. Shareholders (and analysts) of Employer B are delighted when the share price of the Employer
B company stock receives a boost as a result of the large purchase by
the Employer B 401(k) plan. High-level corporate officers whose compensation is based in part on the stock price of Employer B also
benefit. Two years later, the share price of the Employer B company
stock has failed to increase further in value. Meanwhile, the shares of
Company C stock have tripled in value.
The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer B has
breached its duty of loyalty to those participants whose Company C stock
was liquidated and replaced with the company stock ofEmployer B.IS4

Resolving duty of loyalty cases that involved company stock necessarily will turn on the unique facts of each case. The purpose
here is not to provide a global solution to these types of cases, but
rather, to identifY the three approaches the federal courts may
adopt to resolve these cases and discuss their underlying policy
implications.
The first (and most drastic) approach is for the federal courts to
rule that employer decisions concerning company stock, even
company stock held in a 401 (k) plan, are a protected settlor funcls5
tion under ERISA. The settlor function doctrine is a judicially
184. The duty of loyalty question in the fifth hypothetical is triggered by a corporate
merger. Despite the fact that mergers and acquisitions are common, the ERISA fiduciary
duties of corporate employers in these situations are unclear. England, supra note 8, at 70.
ERISA section 208 requires only that after a plan merger, "each participant in the plan
would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the merger, consolidation, or transfer [of plan assets] which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would
have been entitled to receive immediately before the merger, consolidation, or transfer (if
the plan had then terminated)." 29 U.S.C. § 1058 (1994). This provision also is part of the
statutory requirements for qualified plans. I.R.C. § 414(1) (1994); see also A.BA EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at 175-78 (describing how the merger rule works in practice) .
185. In most corporate mergers or acquisitions, the separate 401 (k) plans of the combining corporate entities also must be merged to satisfY the minimum coverage
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created exception to the employer's fiduciary responsibilities un186
der ERISA. The doctrine attempts to draw a sharp line between
actions taken in an employer's corporate capacity and actions
taken in its fiduciary capacity. In a nutshell, the doctrine says that
employer "business" decisions, including decisions involving the
establishment, amendment, merger, or termination of employee
benefit plans are made in the employer's capacity as "settlor" of
the plan and, therefore, are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary duty
. .
187
proVIslOns.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions
188
construing the scope of the settlor function doctrine. The doctrine has yet to be applied, however, to employer decisions
concerning company stock held in a 401 (k) plan, nor should it be
in the future. The settlor function approach is flawed. Although
the settlor function doctrine attempts to distinguish business decisions made by the employer, as the fifth hypothetical illustrates,
such decisions in the 401 (k) plan context quickly cross over into
core ERISA fiduciary functions as defined by the statute.
ERISA defines a fiduciary as anyone who "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management
of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets.,,189 This statutory definition
must be considered in light of the Department of Labor's interpretation that the selection of 401 (k) plan investment options is a
19o
fiduciary function. Referring back to the facts of the fifth hypothetical, the federal courts could attempt to split some fine legal
hairs by drawing a distinction between the removal of the Company C stock as an investment option and the selection of the
Employer B company stock as a replacement. Under this hairsplitting approach, a federal court will view the removal of the
Company C stock as falling within the scope of the settlor function,
characterizing it as part of the termination and merger of the Employer A 401 (k) plan. Employer B's selection of its own company
requirements for qualified retirement plans. I.R.C. § 410(b) (1994). When this plan merger
occurs, ERISA's "anti-cutback" provision, which is also a tax code requirement for qualified
plans, I.R.C. § 411 (d)(6) (1994), does not require the surviving employer to preserve the
pre-existing investments, including company stock, of participants in the acquired 401 (k)
plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.411 (d)-4(d)(7) (2000).
186. Jane K. Stanley, The Definition of a Fiduciary Under ERISA: Basic Principles, 27 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 237, 244-45 (1992).
187. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Lockheed Corp. v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882,890 (1996).
188. See supra note 187.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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stock will, however, under the Department of Labor's interpretation, still be reviewed by the federal courts as a fiduciary act of
Employer B. If a federal court severs these two decisions concerning the 401 (k) plan assets and analyzes them independently,
Employer B can more easily justify its decision to include its own
company stock as an investment option in the 401 (k) plan.
From a policy perspective, the settlor function approach to
company stock scenarios clearly negates the employer's duty of
loyalty in the circumstances in which it is most needed. In the fifth
hypothetical, Employer B's decision to limit the investment options in the 401 (k) plan to Employer B's company stock appears
benign when viewed in isolation. Viewed in the context of the entire transaction, however, Employer B's decision appears to be
tainted by numerous conflicts of interest. A federal court ruling
that Employer B's conduct is protected from judicial scrutiny as a
settlor function will be an open invitation to employer self-dealing
and abuse of 401 (k) plan assets invested in company stock.
A second approach is for the federal courts to rely on evidence
of procedural prudence in determining whether an employer has
satisfied its fiduciary duty of loyalty. An expansive interpretation of
what constitutes a permitted incidental benefit to the corporate
employer may be coupled with this approach. This is the
"formalistic approach."
The formalistic approach has several practical policy implications. A strong and early signal to the employee benefits
community that the federal courts will rely heavily on procedural
prudence will lead to immediate conforming behavior by employers. Policies directing the treatment of 401 (k) plans holding
company stock in mergers or acquisition situations will spring
forth overnight from experts in the employee benefits community.
These same experts will counsel employers to eliminate the appearance of conflicts of interest by eliminating any overlap
between those persons who serve on the corporation's board of
directors and the individuals who form the 401 (k) plan's administrative committee. Meticulous documentation of fiduciary
decisions affecting 401 (k) plans in merger and acquisition situations will occur. Perhaps most practical of all, if the federal courts
adopt a formalistic approach to these cases, summary judgments
based on procedures and related employer documentation will be
made more feasible and more likely to be upheld upon appeal.
Skeptics will argue that excessive reliance on the formalistic approach is inconsistent with ERISA's policy of protecting plan
participants. After all, clever ERISA experts can advise employers
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how to meet the facial standards for procedural prudence, and
document virtually any employer decision. These skeptics are
right. Sole reliance on a formalistic approach will effectively
amend the employer'S statutory duty of loyalty. It will dramatically
lower the traditionally high standard of judicial scrutiny for fiducil91
ary conflicts of interests to a de facto "arbitrary and capricious"
level ofjudicial review. 192
The proper approach for the federal courts to use in cases involving company stock is to engage in a probing analysis of the
employer's decisions consistent with judicial precedent interpreting the employer's duty of loyalty.193 The employer'S apparent
procedural prudence will then be only one factor in determining
whether the duty of loyalty has been satisfied. 194 This is the
"fiduciary scrutiny" approach.
The fiduciary scrutiny approach has several beneficial policy ef195
fects. First, experts in the employee benefits community will be
more likely to counsel employers to avoid future potential problems by not including company stock as an investment option in
newly established 401 (k) plans. Such cautious advice will deter the
practice and thereby reduce the accompanying risk of large investment losses by 401 (k) plan participants. Second, employers
who already have 401 (k) plans with company stock as an investment option will be likely to err on the side of non-interference
with company stock in merger and acquisitions situations. If the
acquiring employer decides that a change must be made that affects the acquired employer's company stock held in a 401 (k)
plan, the acquiring employer will be more likely to make greater
options available to those 401 (k) plan participants. In addition, a
more complete and thorough disclosure of these options by the
acquiring employer is likely to occur.196 Such improved disclosures

191. See supra note 95.
192. Cf In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the district court erred in applying deferential arbitrary and capricious standard to employer's duty of prudence and that the appropriate judicial standard as required by the
statute is "prudence under the circumstances").
193. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
194. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
195. One potential policy concern that is unlikely to materialize from a fiduciary scrutiny approach is a deterrence effect on merger and acquisition activity. In making these
strategic decisions, federal judges need not be concerned that 401 (k) plans will become the
tail that wags the corporate dog. The effect of a merger or acquisition on employee benefit
plans is usually never considered until long after the business details of the deal are finalized. England, supra note 8, at 72 ("Merger negotiations seldom attach a high priority to
workers' nest eggs. Thus, details of pension programs often get short shrift.").
196. Jacobius, supra note 8.
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will enable the 401 (k) plan participants to make more informed
decisions concerning their 401 (k) plan assets.
The costs, in terms of judicial resources, of adopting the fiduciary scrutiny approach will be high. Probing scrutiny is factually
intensive and time-consuming for the federal district court judges
who must act as the triers of fact. 197 The fiduciary scrutiny approach
also is less conducive to summary judgment disposition.1 9B The judicial cost, however, also carries with it potential benefits for
national retirement policy. The fiduciary scrutiny approach is
likely to deter company stock loyalty scenarios in mergers and acquisitions. Employers engaged in mergers and acquisitions will be
reluctant to engage in conduct that may trigger prolonged and
complex ERISA fiduciary litigation. Consequently, the mere threat
of time-consuming and costly federal litigation will serve to protect
participants from the employer misuse of company stock held in
401 (k) plans.
3. The Employer'S Duty of Prudent Diversification and the 404(c)
Regulations Defense-It seems paradoxical to speak of the employer's duty of prudent diversification in the context of a 401 (k)
plan in which the participants themselves direct the investment of
their individual accounts. Nevertheless, the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets remains relevant due to two subtle, yet
significant, Department of Labor interpretations of ERISA section
404(c).
First, an initial affirmative investment direction made by the
plan participant is required to activate the employer's liability exemption under section 404(c).I99 Until this first affirmative
investment direction is made, the employer remains responsible
for the investment of assets held in the participant'S 401 (k) plan
2OO
account. It is only after the participant has made an affirmative
investment direction that, assuming all of the requirements of the
404(c) Regulations have been met, the employer is not responsible
for investment losses resulting from the participant's investment

197. See supra note 12. For an example of the fact-finding task that is likely to face the
federal courts under the fiduciary scrutiny approach, see the federal district court's opinion
in In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 21 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2514 (E.D. Pa.
1997).
198. See In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 1996) (vacating district
court's grant of summary judgment and remanding the case for a bench trial).
199. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
46,906,46,923 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l).
200. Id.; Medill, supra note 22, at 37 (criticizing this rule as misleading to plan participants in practice).
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201

direction.
This agency interpretation has important consequences for the growing interest among employers in so-called
"automatic enrollment" 401 (k) plans. 202
Second, the Department of Labor interprets the 404(c) Regulations as a defense or statutory exemption to employer conduct that
203
violates the duty of prudent diversification of assets. Mere noncompliance with the 404(c) Regulations does not, in and of itself,
establish a breach of the employer's duty of prudent diversification
204
of assets. Therefore, in an action to recover investment losses
from the employer, if the employer has not breached any other
fiduciary duties, the plan participant must establish a breach by the
employer of the duty of prudent diversification of assets. These
types of "sore loser" cases and the employer's related defense un205
der 404(c) Regulations are discussed in Part II.3.b. below.
a. The Employer's Duty of Prudent Diversification and the Automatic
Enrollment Scenario-ERISA section 404(a)(l)(c) requires the employer to "diversify... the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless, under the circumstances,
it is clearly prudent not to do so. ,,206 The legislative history explains
this duty as follows:
Ordinarily the fiduciary should not invest the whole or an
unduly large proportion of the trust property in one type of
security or in various types of securities dependent upon the
success of one enterprise or upon conditions in one locality,
since the effect is to increase the risk of large losses. Thus, although the fiduciary may be authorized to invest in industrial
stocks, he should not invest a disproportionate amount of the
plan assets in the shares of corporations engaged in a particu. d ustry. 207
Iar III

201. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at
46,923.
202. This trend and related policy issues are discussed infra in Parts II.B.3.a. and III.B.2.
203. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,906 & n.2. ERISA section 404(a)(2) exempts participant directed 401 (k) plans from
the duty of prudent diversification with respect to investments in qualifying employer securities. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2) (1994).
204. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (a)(2) (2000); Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906-07 .
. 205. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1.
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a) (1)(C).
207. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038,
5085.
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The federal courts have broad discretion in determining
whether a breach of the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets has occurred. There is no fixed formula or percentage that
will determine when plan assets are concentrated unduly in a sin2oB
gle or similar investment.
Instead, the federal courts must
209
consider all of the facts and circumstances.
Cases construing the employer's duty of prudent diversification
of plan assets are set in the context of plans directed by trustees
210
responsible for the investment of plan assets. In this setting, the
federal courts view the entirety of the plan's investments to deter211
mine whether a breach of duty occurred. In contrast, in the
401 (k) plan context, the appropriate focus is on each participant's
individual account.
Beginning in 1998, the Internal Revenue Service issued a series
of revenue rulings that encourage employers who sponsor 401 (k)
plans to enroll all eligible workers in the plan, deduct a set percentage of employee compensation (typically one to three
212
percent), and contribute that amount to employee 401 (k) plans.
This type of enrollment arrangement is known as an "automatic
enrollment" 401 (k) plan.
In a traditional 401 (k) plan, the employee must affirmatively
enroll as a participant in the plan. 213 Until the enrollment paperwork is completed, the employee may not participate in the 401 (k)
plan. A convenient way to conceptualize the traditional 401 (k)
plan is that the plan presumes an employee will not participate,
and the employee must affirmatively act to overcome that presumption. Of course, there will be a certain group of workers who
will not take action, and, consequently, will not participate in the
plan.
Automatic enrollment arrangements attempt to capture this
group by reversing the presumption of non participation. An
208. In re Unisys Say. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996); H.R. CONF. REp. No.
93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5084.
209. Metzler v. Graham, 112 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1999); Marshall v. Glass/Metal
Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383-84 (D. Haw. 1980); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304,
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5084-85.
210. Metzler, 112 F.3d at 208; Freund v. Marshall, 485 F. Supp. 629, 636 (W.O. Wis.
1979); Glass/Metal Ass 'n, 507 F. Supp. at 378; Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Fund,
458 F. Supp. 986, 988-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
211. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Simmons, 622 F. Supp. 1174,1211 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
212. Rev. Rul. 98-30, 1998-1 C.B. 1273; Rev. Rul. 2000-8, 2000-7 I.R.B. 617; IRS Announcement 2000-60, 2000-31 I.R.B. 149; Bill Barnhart, Questions Abound About Forced
Savings, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 6, 2000, § 5, at 3.
213. Barnhart, supra note 212; Clinton Urges Automatic Enrollment in Employers' Section
401(k) Plans, DAILY TAX REp., June 5, 1998, at G-9 [hereinafter Clinton Urges Automatic Enrollment).
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automatic enrollment plan presumes that every eligible employee
will participate. The employer enrolls every eligible employee and
214
puts the burden on the employee to opt out of the plan. The result is a higher rate of employee participation in the 401 (k) plan. 215
From the perspective of national retirement policy, automatic
enrollment plans are a positive development because they encourage increased retirement savings. Few employers offer such plans,
however. A 1999 survey by Hewitt Associates found that, despite
Internal Revenue Service approval, only seven percent of employers have adopted an automatic enrollment for their 401 (k) plans. 216
One of the major obstacles to the widespread adoption of automatic enrollment plans is the legal ambiguity surrounding the
employer's fiduciary responsibility and potential liability under
217
ERISA. This ambiguity is illustrated by the sixth hypothetical.

SIXTH HYPOTHETICAL

Employer adopts an automatic enrollment 401 (k) plan. The plan
provides that upon commencement of employment all eligible employees are enrolled as participants in the plan. Employer will deduct and
contribute to the plan three percent of each employee's compensation.
The employee can "opt out" of participating in the 401 (k) plan by
completing the necessary paperwork.
The 401(k) plan provides that unless and until the employee elects
differently, the employee's contributions to the plan will be invested in
a money market mutual fund that earns an investment return offive
percent annually. All employees are notified of this "default" investment provision and are encouraged to exercise their right to invest in
214. Barnhart supra note 212.
215. I.R.S. Announcement 2000-60, 2000-31 I.R.B. 149; Clinton Urges Automatic EnroUment, supra note 213; see also PROFIT SHARING/401 (K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, AUTOMATIC
ENROLLMENT 2000, at http://www.psca.org (last visited on May 8,2001) (study of how companies structure their automatic enrollment plans) (on file with author). SUlVey results
indicate that automatic enrollment plans have an employee participation rate of ninety
percent or more, compared with a participation rate in traditional 401 (k) plans of around
seventy percent. See Barnhart, supra note 212.
216. Hewitt Associates, supra note 41. This was an increase from just four percent in
1997. /d.
217. See Barnhart, supra note 212. Another legal obstacle to the widespread adoption of
automatic enrollment plans is the uncertainty as to whether this type of arrangement violates state laws governing employee payroll deductions and, if so, whether such state laws
are nonetheless preempted by ERISA A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article.

SPRING

2001]

Stock Market Volatility

517

the diversified range of investment options available to participants
in the 401 (k) plan.
In 1998, Employee A is automatically enrolled in the 401 (k) plan
upon commencement of her employment. Employee A never opts out of
the 401 (k) plan and fails to exercise her right to select the investment
options for her contributions automatically made to the plan. As a result, her contributions are invested in the plan's default option, the
money market mutual fund.
In 2005, Employee A is ready to retire. Her 401 (k) plan account has
experienced investment earnings from the money market fund equal to
fifty percent of her total contributions. Employee A is upset when she
learns that if her 401 (k) contributions had been invested instead in
one or a combination of the plan's equity-based mutual funds, her retirement benefit from the 401 (k) plan would have been three hundred
percent more due to the greater investment returns.
Employee A sues Employer for breach of its fiduciary duty of prudent
diversification. The question presented to the federal court is whether
the Employer is liable under ERISA for the "lost" investment gains
Employee A did not receive because her contributions were invested in
the plan's default money market fund instead of an equity-based mutual fund or funds.

The sixth hypothetical raises three novel issues for resolution by
the federal courts. These issues involve interpretation of the
404(c) Regulations, the employer's fiduciary duty of prudent diversification of plan assets, and ERISA's remedy provisions.
The first issue raised by the sixth hypothetical is whether Employee A made an affirmative investment direction sufficient to
trigger the 404(c) Regulations. If so, Employer may assert as a defense exemption from fiduciary liability under the 404(c)
Regulations. The historical development of the 404( c) Regulations
suggests how the federal courts should approach this issue. When
the Department of Labor first proposed the 404(c) Regulations in
1987, the agency initially extended the liability exemption of
ERISA section 404(c) to employers in situations in which the par218
ticipant had not made an affirmative investment direction. To
qualifY for this protection, the employer had to satisfy several conditions, but primarily the participant's account had to be invested
218. Proposed Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 52
Fed. Reg. 33,508, 33,511-12 (Sept. 3, 1987).
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219
in one of two possible "safe" default investment options. These
two safe default options were an interest-bearing bank deposit ac220
count or a money market mutual fund. Commentators on the
1987 draft asked that this provision be deleted from the 404(c)
Regulations, in part because "sponsors would rather retain fiduciary responsibility for contributions as to which participants and
beneficiaries have not submitted instructions than avail themselves
of the relief described in the proposal.,,221 In addition, "the comments and the statistical evidence submitted indicated that very few
plans providing for direction by participants and beneficiaries offered the vehicles specified, and that for plans which did, a
negligible amount of plan assets directed into such options.,,222 In
other words, employer protection in default investment situations
was unnecessary.
The next version of the 404(c) Regulations, issued in 1991,
223
omitted the default investment option provision. By this time,
commentators on the regulations were having second thoughts,
and requested that the Department of Labor reinstate a default
investment provision extending relief from liability to employers
where the participant failed to make an affirmative investment di224
rection. The Department of Labor considered this suggestion
225
and expressly rejected it in the final 404(c) Regulations in 1992.
The agency emphasized its position that the employer would remain responsible for investment decisions unless or until an
226
affirmative investment direction was made by the participant.
The Department of Labor's official interpretation of the final
404(c) Regulations provides some guidance concerning the meaning of an affirmative investment direction. Merely disclosing to
participants in the summary plan description where their 401 (k)
plan money will be invested if they fail to provide investment directions is insufficient to rise to the level of an affirmative investment
227
direction. Under this interpretation, mere inaction by the participant can never rise to the level of an affirmative investment
direction, no matter how well-informed the participant may be
concerning the consequences of his failure to act. In contrast, if
219. ld.
220. ld.
221. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,923 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l).
222. ld.
223. ld.
224. See id.
225. ld.
226. See id.
227. ld. at 46,924.
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the participant "signs an instruction form specifying how assets in
his account will be invested" in the absence of his affirmative direction, this act of written consent can operate as an affirmative
22M
investment direction. The circumstances surrounding this written consent, however, must indicate that the participant'S consent
was both informed and voluntary.229
In the sixth hypothetical, Employee A never gave her written
consent to Employer's default investment option. Therefore, a
federal court hearing this type of case must go on to address two
more issues. These issues concern the statutory interpretation of
ERISA's fiduciary duty and remedy provisions.
Even though the 404(c) Regulations are not available as a
defense to the Employer, to prevail on her claim, Employee A
must still establish that investing her contributions in the money
market fund was a breach of the Employer's duty of prudent
diversification of plan assets under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(c).23o
The statutory language of section 404(a) (1) (c) raises two
interpretive issues. First, did Employer fail to diversify the account
by investing the 401 (k) plan assets in a safe, but low-earning,
money market fund?231 If so, was Employer's decision to invest all
of the account in the money market fund nevertheless prudent
under the circumstances? Here the sixth hypothetical highlights
the ambiguity in the statutory description of Employer's duty of
prudent diversification of plan assets. In the hypothetical,
Employer's default investment option, a money market fund,
minimizes the risk of a loss of principal. It should be noted,
though, that at least one federal court has interpreted section
404(a) (l)(c) expansively, ruling that the duty of prudent
diversification of plan assets is not strictly limited to a loss of
232
principal but may apply to other types of risk as well.
From a policy perspective, a federal court's task in interpreting
the statutory language is difficult because at the time the statute

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. The plan participant bears the initial burden of proving that the fiduciary responsible for investing the plan's assets failed to diversify the investments. See Metzler v. Graham,
112 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 421, 438-40 (3d Cir.
1996); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038,
5084. Once this initial burden of proof has been satisfied, the burden then shifts to the
fiduciary to prove that their investment decisions were prudent under the circumstances. See
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 304, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. at 5084.
231. See Barnhart, supra note 212 (finding that eighty percent of 401 (k) plan accounts
automatically enrolled by the employer are invested in low-yielding money market funds).
232. GlW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton &Jacobson, Inc., lO Employee Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2290,2300-04 (S.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 895 F.2d 729, 731 (11th Cir. 1990).
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was drafted, the 401 (k) plan did not exist. As a result, the statutory
interpretation approach that relies on "plain meaning" becomes
inherently unreliable. As instructed by Congress, the federal courts
must seek to interpret the statutory language "bearing in mind the
233
special nature and purpose" of 401 (k) plans.
ERISA section 404(a) (1) (c) was written with a different type of
retirement plan in mind: the traditional defined benefit plan in
234
which the employer is responsible for investing the plan's assets.
In this type of plan, the amount of the participant's eventual retirement benefits is not dependent on plan investment earnings. If
the plan's assets lose money, the employer remains financially responsible so that the participants will receive their promised levels
ofbenefits. 235 In the event the employer is unable to pay the promised benefits, the benefits are federally insured by the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 236 In this context, the employer's fiduciary duty to diversifY and thereby avoid the "risk of
large losses" is sound policy. It preempts the type of catastrophic
losses that would undermine both the employer's ability to pay
and, ultimately, the fiscal soundness of the PBGC insurance program.
The retirement benefits under a 401 (k) plan are fundamentally
different. In a 401 (k) plan, the participant's retirement benefit
consists of the amount in her 401 (k) plan account at retirement,
usually paid as a lump sum.237 In the 401 (k) plan context, the risk
of loss is amenable to at least three possible judicial interpretations. Loss can be defined as a loss of principal, an inflationary
loss, or an opportunity loss.
The difference between a loss of principal and an inflationary
loss is illustrated by the following example. Assume that the Employer in the sixth hypothetical had automatically deducted $500
each month from Employee A's paycheck and contributed this
amount to her 401 (k) plan account. Mter twenty years, Employee
A would have accumulated $120,000 in retirement savings attributable solely to contributions. For simplicity of illustration, assume
that these contributions had been secured in a bank vault, in cash,
for those twenty years. Employee A has not "lost" one penny on
her principal amount of $120,000 as an accountant would define
the term, but in an economic sense, Employee A suffered a very

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5083.
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 45-46,50-54.
Id.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
Reforming ERISA, supra note 52.
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real injury. Inflation over those twenty years eroded greatly the
purchasing power of her $120,000, creating an inflationary loss.
From the perspective of national retirement policy, investing
401 (k) plan contributions in a money market fund does little to
enhance the retirement income security of the plan participants.
The minimal earnings of the money market fund may provide
some protection against inflationary loss in periods of relatively
low inflation. But in a money market investment situation, the
401 (k) plan participants suffer another type of loss-they have
forgone the greater investment returns produced by a diversified
portfolio invested prudently and broadly over the long term in the
equity markets. This forfeiture of greater investment returns is an
opportunity loss.
A final consideration in the interpretation of the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets is the employer's likely
motivation for selecting the money market fund as the default investment option. Given the certain opportunity loss, such an
investment is of dubious prudence. Then, why do employers do it?
Employers fear the potential fiduciary liability for a loss of princi238
pal. If the participant's contributions are invested in a money
market fund, the risk of a loss of principal is eliminated. Absent
this fear, employers in general would be willing to select a more
volatile, but in the long run, more rewarding, default investment
option for their automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. Part III demonstrates how, through interpretation of ERISA's remedy
provisions, the federal courts can encourage employers to select
default investment options that minimize the risk of opportunity
losses for the employees who are enrolled automatically in 401 (k)
plans.
b. The Sore Loser Scenario-It should be evident that the 404(c)
Regulations will be available as an employer defense in ERISA fiduciary litigation only in a narrow category of cases. The employer
cannot assert the 404(c) Regulations as a defense to an alleged
breach of the duty of prudence nor the duty of loyalty.239 In addition, the defense is not available where the participant never
240
affirmatively directed the investment of her 401 (k) plan account.
The narrow category of cases where the 404(c) Regulations are
available as an employer defense are the "sore loser" cases. The
sore loser scenario assumes that the participant affirmatively directed the investment of her 401 (k) plan account. It further
238.
239.
240.

Barnhart, supra note 212.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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assumes that the employer fulfilled its duty of prudence in selecting the plan's investment options and that there is no allegation
that the employer's decision was tainted by self-interest. With these
underlying assumptions in mind, the seventh hypothetical describes a sore loser case.

SEVENTH HYPOTHETICAL

Employer establishes a 401 (k) plan. Encouraged by spectacular investment returns in prior years, Employee A invests 100 % of her
401 (k) plan account in a high technology stock mutual fund.
In 2005, Employee A is ready to retire. She is upset that her retirement
benefit from the 401 (k) plan is less than the amount of her contributions made to the plan over the years, that is, that her 401(k) plan
investment in the high technology stock fund has lost money.
Employee A sues Employer for breach of its fiduciary duty of prudent
diversification under ERISA, seeking to recoup her investment losses.
The Employer defends by asserting that it complied with the 404(c)
Regulations and therefore is not liable for Employee A's investment
losses. The question presented to the federal court is whether Employer
has "complied" with the 404(c) Regulations.

The discussion below presents a general overview of the employer's defense under the 404(c) Regulations. In keeping with the
premise of this Article, areas where broad policy-making discretion
is conferred upon the federal court are highlighted and dis241
cussed.
The exercise of this discretion is likely to have a
significant and sweeping impact on national retirement policy for
the foreseeable future.
(i). The Framework of the Employer's 404(c) Regulations DeJenseThere are three basic plan design requirements under the 404(c)
Regulations. First, the plan must offer a broad and diversified
range of at least three investment options to plan participants (the
diversified range rule).242 The purpose of the diversified range rule
is to ensure that participants have the opportunity to avoid the risk
of incurring large investment losses by diversifying their account

241. The reader interested in the technical nuances of the 404(c) Regulations should
consult the footnotes accompanying this discussion and the original sources cited therein.
242. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c·1 (b) (1) (ii), (b) (3) (2000).
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243
portiolio. Each investment option must present materially differ244
ent risk and return characteristics. Other than these criteria, the
404(c) Regulations leave the selection of specific types of investment options up to the fiduciary discretion of the sponsoring
245
employer.
Second, the plan must allow participants to transfer the assets in
their account into and out of the various plan investment options
with a frequency that is reasonable in light of the market volatility
of those investment options (the general volatility rule).246 At a
minimum, the plan participants must be allowed to make transfers
among at least three of the investment options not less frequently
than every three months (the three-month minimum rule).247 The
underlying purpose of the general volatility and three-month
minimum rules, is to allow the plan participants to minimize large
investment losses by quickly transferring out of sinking investments. 248 Subject to the three-month minimum rule, the 404(c)
Regulations leave the determination of how frequently the participants are allowed to transfer investments up to the fiduciary
249
discretion of the sponsoring employer.
Third, the plan's investment options must permit participants to
actually diversifY the investment of their plan accounts (the actual
diversification rule).250 Under the actual diversification rule, the
plan's design must take into account how the small size of participants' account balances may limit their ability to achieve
251
investment diversification. In particular, if the plan's investment
options are limited to individual stocks or bonds, participants with
243. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
46,906,46,918-9 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550404c-1).
244. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b) (3).
245. Earlier drafts of the 404(c) Regulations are more specific concerning the types of
investment options offered. These proposed rules were eliminated in the final regulation to
preserve employer flexibility. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual
Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,919-20.
246. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c·l (b)(2) (ii) (C). There are two alternative methods for satisfying
the general volatility rule. One is to require at least a single core investment option to accept
transfers coming in (that is, a transfer out of a volatile investment must be able to go somewhere else) at least as frequently as any volatile investment, where transfers are allowed in
excess of every three months. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C) (2) (i). An alternative method of
compliance is to establish a cash-equivalency fund that receives and holds transfers out of a
volatile investment until the next transfer period arrives. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C) (2) (ii).
247. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(ii)(C)(I).
248. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,914-15.
249. See id.
250. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b) (3)(i)(C).
25l. [d.; Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57
Fed. Reg. at 46,920.
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small account balances will be unable to achieve a diversified ac252
count portfolio. To satisfY the actual diversification rule, the plan
can offer "look-through investment vehicles" (for example, mutual
funds)253 as investment options. 254 Actual diversification is then determined by looking through to the assets underlying the
investment vehicle. It is the actual diversification rule that results
in the selection of mutual funds as investment options for almost
255
all 401 (k) plans.
Although company stock is not considered a suitable investment
option for purposes of satisfYing the diversified range rule, the
404(c) Regulations expressly permit the employer to offer plan
256
participants company stock as an additional investment option.
Certain additional rules apply to plans that offer company stock as
257
an investment option. The fundamental purpose of these special
rules is to ensure that the investment decisions made by the plan
participants are truly independent and not subject to undue influ258
ence by the employer.
First, company stock offered as an investment option must be
259
publicly traded. The purpose of the publicly traded requirement
is to ensure that the 401 (k) plan participants can buy and sell the
company stock in a market that is free from influence by the employer. 260 Second, the plan must have procedures in place to
safeguard the confidentiality of information relating to the pur261
chase, sale, and holding of company stock by participants. Third,
the plan must designate a fiduciary to monitor compliance with

252. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,920-21,46,921 n.19.
253. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(e)(l)(i).
254. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,921.
255. Recently it has become more common for 401 (k) plans to allow participants to invest in individual stocks besides employer securities, or in more volatile sector funds limited
to technology or internet stocks. Employers Should Muue with Caution on Internet Stocks, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION NEWS, Aug. 16, 1999, at 6; Linton, supra note 49; Hewitt Associates,
supra note 41.
256. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,919.
257. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4).
258. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
at 46,922.
259. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (E)(4)(iii). To satisfY this requirement, the company stock must be traded either on a national exchange or in another generally
recognized market. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57
Fed. Reg. at 46,927.
260. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 46,927.
261. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (d) (2) (ii) (E)( 4)(vii).
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these confidentiality procedures. 262 This designated monitoring
fiduciary, however, is not required to be independent of the em263
ployer. If the monitoring fiduciary finds that there is there is
potential for undue influence despite the existence of such procedures, the monitoring fiduciary must appoint an independent
third-party fiduciary to handle 401 (k) plan transactions involving
264
company stock. Typical situations likely to trigger the appointment of an independent fiduciary are tender offers, exchange
offers, and contested elections for directors. 265
.
In addition to the three basic plan design requirements, the
404(c) Regulations require that the employer (or its agent)266 provide participants certain types of information concerning the plan
and its investment options. The purpose of these informational
requirements is to "ensure that participants and beneficiaries in
ERISA section 404(c) plans have sufficient information to make
informed investment decisions.,,267 One set of informational requirements mandates the types of information that must be
supplied to all plan participants (mandatory information). 266 The
other set of informational requirements prescribes the additional
types of information that must be provided only if a plan participant requests it (upon request information) .269
The mandatory information category includes: (1) an
explanation that the plan is intended to constitute an ERISA
section 404(c) plan and that plan fiduciaries may be relieved of
liability for losses which are the result of participants' investment
instructions; (2) a description of the investment alternatives
available under the plan, including a general description of the
investment objectives and risk and return characteristics of each
alternative; (3) an explanation of how to give investment
instructions, any limits or restrictions on giving instructions, and
262. [d. § 2550A04c-l (d)(2)(ii)(E) (4) (viii).
263. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 46,926. Earlier drafts of the proposed 404(c) Regulations had required an independent fiduciary. [d.
264. [d. at 46,926-27.
265. [d. at 46,927.
266. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (b)(2)(i)(B); see also Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,910 ("[TJhere is nothing in the
regulation which precludes a plan fiduciary from designating another person or persons to
actually furnish the required information ... .").
267. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. 46,906, 46,909-10 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F:R. § 2550A04c-l). I have questioned strongly elsewhere whether the 404(c) Regulations in fact fulfill this objective.
Medill, supra note 22, at 35-36,63-64.
268. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (b) (2) (i) (B) (1) (2000).
269. [d. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i)(B)(2).

526

University ofMichigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 34:3

any restrictions on the exercise of voting, tender or similar rights;
(4) a description of any transaction fees or expenses that are
charged to the participant's account; and (5) a description of the
additional information that is available on request and the identity
27o
of the person(s) responsible for providing that information. If
the participant invests in a vehicle that is subject to federal
securities laws, the participant must be given a copy of the most
recent prospectus (unless the prospectus was furnished
immediately before the participant'S investment).271 If the
investment involves the exercise of voting, tender, or similar rights,
and these rights are passed through to participants, the participant
also must receive any materials related to the exercise of these
272
rights.
The "upon request" information category includes: (1) a description of the annual operating expenses of the plan's
investment alternatives, including any investment management
fees; (2) copies of any prospectuses, financial statements and reports and other information furnished to the plan relating to an
investment alternative; (3) list of assets comprising the portfolio of
each of the investment alternatives that hold plan assets;
(4) information concerning the value of shares or units in investment alternatives available under the plan along with information
concerning the past and current investment performance of each
alternative; and (5) information concerning the value of shares or
units in investment alternatives held in the account of the partici273
pant.
Although the 404(c) Regulations clearly are based on the assumption that the informational requirements will enable
participants to make informed investment decisions,274 the regulations do not require the employer to provide plan participants
. th el. th er mvestment
.
' 2 7or
5.
WI
ed
ucatlOn
mvestment a d'
Vlce. 276
270. Id. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i) (B) (1).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(i) (B)(2).
274. Medill, supra note 22, at 63-66.
275 .. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2) (i)(B)(I),(2) (listing mandatory and upon request disclosure information that must be provided to plan participants).
276. 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l (c)(4); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed
Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,922. Recent caselaw developments have caused
experts in the employee benefits community to question whether ERISA's general fiduciary
duty of prudence requires the employer to provide more and different types of information
to plan participants than the mandatory and upon request information required by the
404(c) Regulations. See generaUy, William J. Arnone, A New Fiduciary Challenge to 401(k) Plan
SPOnsfffS, BENEFITS Q., Apr. I, 1999, at 49 (1999) (suggesting strategies for dealing with the
increased necessity for employee financial education as a means of establishing a defense to
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(ii). Policy Making by the Federal Courts in Interpreting the 404(c)
Regulations--Given the discretion the federal courts hold in interpreting the 404(c) Regulations, it is important to recall the first set
of competing policy choices presented in this Article-employer
277
burden versus participant protection. The Department of Labor's official interpretations of the 404(c) Regulations appear to
weigh heavily on the side of participant protection. These official
interpretations lie in three key areas.
If faced with a sore loser case under the 404(c) Regulations, a
natural reaction by a federal judge unschooled in the history and
nuances of ERISA may be to start from the presumption (spoken
or unspoken) that the plan participants "assumed the risk" of loss
when they directed the investment of their accounts. Contrary to
this intuitive reaction, ERISA historically and fundamentally protects plan participants by placing the fiduciary responsibility for
278
ensuring the integrity of plan assets on the sponsoring employer.
Generally, ERISA's fiduciary protections cannot be waived by plan
participants, nor can the plan's fiduciaries be absolved from fiduciary liability for breach of their duties by the terms of the plan's
. d ocument (s ) .279
governmg
The first key Department of Labor interpretation of the 404(c)
Regulations is rooted firmly in these fundamental and overarching
ERISA fiduciary principles. In the preamble to the final 404(c)
Regulations, the Department of Labor states that ERISA section
404(c) is similar to a statutory exception to the general fiduciary
provisions of ERISA and, accordingly, "the person asserting applicability of the exception will have the burden of proving that the conditions of
sections 404(c) and any regulation thereunder have been met.,,280 Thus,
the employer who asserts a 404(c) Regulations defense bears the
burden of proof.
The second key Department of Labor interpretation of the
404(c) Regulations concerns the scope of the employer's exemption from fiduciary liability. The Department of Labor views ERISA
section 404(c) as a transactional exemption, as opposed to a blanket,
plan-wide exemption. This means that
allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty under section 404(c». A discussion of this issue,
which has yet to be addressed by the federal courts, is beyond the scope of this Article. For
one perspective, see Sayles, supra note 6, at 1493-98.
277. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
278. See 29 U.S.c. § l104(a) (1994); Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed
Individual Account Plans; 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906-07.
279. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1994); A.BA EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., supra note 12, at
344-46.
280. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 46,906 (emphasis added).
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[t] he relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
ERISA that is provided by section 404(c) applies only to individual transactions that meet the criteria established by that
section, i.e., the transaction must be executed pursuant to the
kind of plan described in section 404(c) and the participant
or beneficiary must actually have exercised control with respect to the transaction. Thus, a determination whether
sections 404 (c)( 1) and (2) apply can only be made on a case by
. 281
case baszs.
In other words, the federal courts are instructed to look at the
individual circumstances of each participant, rather than reviewing
(and dismissing) the claims of the plan's participants as a whole. 282
The third key Department of Labor interpretation concerns the
nature of the employer's burden of proof. During the notice and
comment process for the 404(c) Regulations, several commentators suggested that the Department of Labor adopt a reading of
the Regulations as a "safe harbor.,,283 Adoption of the 404(c) Regulations as a safe harbor would have allowed an employer who failed
to comply with its terms to argue that "the particular plan and any
particular participant-directed transaction" fell within the statutory
exemption of ERISA section 404(c).284 The Department of Labor
explicitly rejected this proposed safe harbor interpretation of the
285
statute. Consequently, if the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of the 404(c) Regulations, the liability exemption of
ERISA section 404(c) is not available as an employer defense.
The 404(c) Regulations are replete with adjectives that invite
the exercise of judicial discretion, particularly in the area of
286
judicial fact-finding. Judicial interpretation of terms such as

281. [d. (emphasis added).
282. Such an intensive factual inquiry presents two practical problems for the federal
judiciary. First, it is likely to present difficulties in the certification and trial of class action
lawsuits involving the 404(c) Regulations. Second, it is likely to consume a significant
amount ofjudicial resources, particularly at the district court level, where the federal judge
acts as the trier of fact. These practical problems of case docket management, however,
should not deter the federal courts from assuming the significant policy making role that
has been delegated to them by the Department of Labor through the 404(c) Regulations.
See infra Part III.B.
283. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 46,907.
284. [d.
285. [d.
286. It is worth reemphasizing here that in ERISA fiduciary litigation there is no jury
trial, and the court is the trier offact. See supra note 12.
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"reasonable,,,287 "material,,,288 "improper" or "undue" employer
influence,289 and, most discretionary of all, "depends on the facts
and circumstances of the particular case"290 will determine the
employer's compliance with the 404(c) Regulations. Judicial
discretion also applies in the evaluation of the employer's fiduciary
decisions concerning the diversified range and general volatility
rules governing the investment options offered under the plan. 291
It is through this grant of broad judicial discretion that the Department of Labor effectively delegated its policy-making role to
the federal courts. Whether such delegation of agency policymaking authority to the federal courts is necessarily improper or
inappropriate is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article argues that the federal courts should acknowledge and accept
the significant role they play in shaping national retirement policy.
The federal courts have an enormous degree of flexibility in dealing with individual cases involving 401 (k) plans. This flexibility,
depending on how it is asserted, can either promote or undermine
national retirement policy. To ignore, either unknowingly or willingly, the broader policy implications ofjudicial decisions in ruling
on individual cases is simply irresponsible.
The 404(c) Regulations invite the federal courts to engage in
three distinct areas of policy making for 401 (k) plans. The first two
areas are plan structural policy and plan operational policy. The third
area of judicial policy making involves company stock situations in
which the employer potentially exercises undue influence over the

287. Judicial inquiry into reasonableness will be necessary when: considering whether
to allow the employer to charge the expenses of carrying out investment instructions to the
participant's account, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b)(2)(ii)(A) (2000); specifying the frequency with which participants must be allowed to transfer out of volatile investments under
the general volatility rule, id. § 2550.404c-l (b) (2) (ii) (C); specifying the opportunity that
must be given to the participants to exercise voting, tender, or other rights associated with
the ownership of employer securities, id. § 2550.404c-l (c) (1) (ii); or, regulating transactions
involving a plan fiduciary, id. § 2550.404c·l (c)(3).
288. Judicial inquiry into materiality will arise under: the diversified range rule, id.
§ 2550.404c·l (b) (3), and the provisions preventing the exercise of independent participant
control if the plan fiduciary concealed private facts not otherwise prohibited from disclosure
under federal or state securities laws, id. § 2550.404c·l (c) (2) (ii).
289. Judicial inquiry concerning the improper influence of an employer will arise in
the context of any participant transactions, including the exercise of ownership rights involving employer securities, id. § 2550.404c-l (c)(2)(i), or the necessity for appointment of
an independent fiduciary, id. § 2550.404c-l (d)(2)(ii) (£)( 4)(ix).
290. The 404(c) Regulations require that the participant must have, in fact, exercised
independent investment control. Id. § 2550.404c-l (c)(l)(i). The regulations specifically
state that " [wlhether a participant or beneficiary has exercised independent control in fact
with respect to a transaction depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case."
Id. § 2550.404c-l (c) (2).
291. See supra Part II.B.3.b.
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401 (k) plan participants. This third area is plan fiduciary policy.
Each type ofjudicial policy making is discussed below.
Plan structural policy centers around the design of the 401 (k)
plan itself. It involves questions such as whether the plan's investment options satisfy the diversified range rule,292 or whether the
plan's investment transfer rules comply with the general volatility
293
rule. Plan structural policy issues are characterized by their focus
on the plan's design features, which are determined by the documents that establish the 401 (k) plan itself. 294
If the federal court determines that a plan design feature fails to
meet the requirements of the 404(c) Regulations, the plan as a
whole is "flawed.,,295 Ajudicial ruling that a 401 (k) plan has a structural flaw has consequences both at the level of the individual
litigants in the action and, more importantly, the industry level. At
the level of individual litigants, every participant in the 401 (k) plan
will have the opportunity to assert a sore loser claim against the
employer. This result occurs because a plan structural flaw affects
every plan participant. Under the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 404(c) Regulations, a plan structural flaw eliminates
the employer's ability to assert a section 404(c) defense to such
claims with respect to all of the participants in the 401 (k) plan. 296
The employer will be deemed responsible (and thus liable) for any
investment losses incurred by each participant account that was
292. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-2(b) (1) (ii),(b)(3).
293. Id. § 2550.404c-2(b) (2) (ii) (C).
294. 29 U.S.C. § 1l02(a)(l) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b).
295. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg.
46,906, 46,906 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l). The Department of
Labor's commentary accompanying the finaI404(c) Regulations states:
The relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA that is provided by
section 404(c) applies only to individual transactions that meet the criteria established by that section, i.e., the transaction must be executed pursuant to the kind of plan
described in section 404(c) and the participant or beneficiary must actually have exercised control with respect to the transaction.
Id. at 46,906 (emphasis added). A structural design feature that fails to meet the criteria
established by the 404(c) Regulations will cause the plan to fail to qualify as an "ERISA section 404(c) plan." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l (b). Thus, every participant transaction will fail to
meet the standards for relief from the fiduciary responsibility provisions established by the
404(c) Regulations.
296. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (b). The Department of Labor considered and expressly
rejected a proposed interpretation of section 404(c) that characterized the regulations as
merely establishing a safe harbor. Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual
Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,907. Consequently, an employer who fails to satisfy all of
the 404(c) Regulation's criteria cannot argue that "the particular plan and any particular
participant directed transaction executed pursuant to such plan falls within the statutory
definition. Id. at 46,907.
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297

not prudently diversified. This employer liability attaches even
though the employer has never exercised control over the invest298
ments in the participant's 401 (k) plan account.
A judicial ruling that a 401 (k) plan is structurally flawed will
have a second effect at the industry level. The full service providers
who sell 401 (k) plans to employers typically offer a menu of stan99
300
dardized planl for their customers. These standardized plans are
easy, and thus inexpensive, for the employer to establish and for
301
the service provider to administer. Standardized plans use the
same basic set of plan documents and have a limited number of
302
options concerning the plan's design features. Thus, a ruling by
a federal court that one employer's standardized 401 (k) plan is
structurally flawed potentially sets up collateral estoppel claims for
participants in the hundreds, or even thousands, of virtually identical 401(k) plans sold by the same service provider. Such lawsuits
brought on a wide scale will have a significant chilling effect on the
future establishment of 401 (k) plans by employers. Given the significance of 401 (k) plans to national retirement policy, the federal
courts should consider carefully the potential adverse impact of
303
such a chilling effect.
Plan operational policy centers around the actual day-to-day administration of the plan. Plan operational policy questions are
intensely factual in nature. They are characterized by a focus on
whether the performance of the persons responsible for operating
the plan, in fact, lived up to the standards set forth in the 404(c)
Regulations. An example of a plan operational policy question is
whether a participant was provided with all of the required mandatory information proscribed by the 404 (c) Regulations. Again,
297. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)(C) (1994); Final Rule Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 46,906 ("It is the Department's view that section
404(c) is similar to a statutory exception to the general fiduciary provisions of ERISA and,
accordingly, the person asserting applicability of the exception will have the burden of
proving that conditions of section 404(c) and any regulations thereunder have been met.").
298. See sources cited supra note 297.
299. There are two types of standardized retirement plans. Prototype plans generally consist of a governing plan document and an adoption agreement that allows the employer to
select among a limited number of optional plan features. David A. Hildebrandt & William
H. Cowper, Qualified Plans-IRS Determination Letter Procedures, 360-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) , A14 (Feb. 28, 2000). Master plans are set in form and do not offer the employer flexibility in
terms of selecting plan design features. Id.
300. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 239-40.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id.

Cf Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231-32 (2000) (recognizing that the federal
judiciary should not act contrary to congressional policy by entertaining ERISA fiduciary
claims that attack plan structure unconnected to claims of specific harm to plan participants).
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under the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 404(c)
Regulations, an operational flaw will eliminate the employer's ability to assert a section 404(c) defense. There is one highly
significant difference, however, between plan structural flaws and
plan operational flaws. A plan operational flaw eliminates the employer's Section 404(c) defense only with respect to the individual
participant(s) affected by the operational errores), not for all of the participants in the 401(k) plan;304 a structural flaw eliminates the defense
305
with respect to all 401 (k) participants.
A sore loser claim involving alleged plan operational flaws raises
difficult problems of proof for the employer. These evidentiary
problems arise because of the Department of Labor's position that
the employer bears the burden of showing compliance with the
306
404(c) Regulations. As a matter of convenience, the typical employer delegates the day-to-day operation and administration of
307
the 401 (k) plan to a full service provider. Although the Department of Labor acknowledges that this practice is widespread, it
nevertheless maintains that the employer remains ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with the 404(c) Regulations. 308
Construed strictly, the Department of Labor's position requires
the employer to prove actual operational compliance for each individual participant for every investment transaction. Such a strict
approach will make the employer's evidentiary burden of proof
impossible to carry in sore loser litigation. Absent a pattern and
practice of blatant operational noncompliance, the federal courts
must decide whether such minute and detailed operational scrutiny is necessary or desirable in light of ERISA's policy objectives.
304. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg., 46,906, 46,910 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2550A04c-l) ("the participant
... must actually have exercised control with respect to the transaction").
305. Seediscussion supra note 295.
306. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 46,910.
307. I have explained elsewhere why, for financial reasons, the full service provider is
highly unlikely to be a fiduciary of the plan, and, therefore, cannot be sued for a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Medii!, supra note 22, at 38-49. The Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000),
allows a plan fiduciary to bring suit against a non-fiduciary plan service provider under
ERISA section 502(a) (3) for engaging in a prohibited transaction. Prohibited Transactions:
Attorneys Ponder Non-Fiduciary Liability in Aftennath of Harris Trust Ruling, PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY REp., June 19, 2000, at 27. Although a discussion of the new potential claims
against non-fiduciary service providers made possible under Harris is beyond the scope of
this Article, the reader should note that the remedies available to plan participants under
ERISA section 502(a) (3) are, under current Supreme Court precedent, extremely limited.
See infra Part lILA.
308. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 57 Fed.
Reg., at 46,910.
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Close judicial scrutiny of the day-to-day administration of any
401 (k) plan is likely to unveil a few isolated instances of operational error, even in the best administered plan. Thus, a judicial
standard of strict scrutiny likely will have a chilling effect on plan
sponsorship by even the most conscientious of employers. An alternative standard for resolving plan operational policy questions
permits an employer to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proving
compliance with the 404(c) Regulations by showing that it had
procedures in place to monitor periodically the overall operational
performance of the service provider. The proposed judicial standard provides a more reasonable approach to resolving ERISA's
fundamental policy choice between employer burden and participant protection. An employer's delegation of plan operational
responsibility to a service provider without any monitoring procedures in place puts plan participants at risk. To require such
monitoring will not place an undue burden on employers. Rather,
periodic monitoring of the plan's service provider is already a re309
quired fiduciary responsibility of the employer. If the employer
fails to assume this fiduciary responsibility, there will be a very real
consequence under the alternative judicial standard-potential
employer liability for investment losses in sore loser litigation.
The alternative standard may be criticized as inconsistent with
the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 404(c) Regula31G
tions as a transactional exemption. The response is that although
the federal courts under Chevron must give deference to the Department of Labor's reasonable interpretation,311 it is exclusively
the prerogative of the federal courts to determine the types of evidence that the employer can use to attempt to prove compliance.
The alternative standard is similar to the well-established practice
of admitting evidence of habit to prove conduct in a particular in312
stance.
Finally, if the federal courts consistently rule that 401 (k) plans
have either structural or operational flaws, the courts will create an
incentive for participants to select 401 (k) plan investments that are
not prudently diversified. If plan participants know that they stand
a good chance of prevailing in sore loser litigation, they have an
incentive to concentrate their 401 (k) plan investments in high risk
investment options that potentially carry a large reward. If these
investments succeed, the participant is rewarded accordingly. If
309.
3lO.
311.
(1984).
312.

See supra note 98.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
See FED. R.

EVID.

406.
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these high risk investments fail, the participant has a form of insurance against her investment losses in the form of ERISA
fiduciary litigation against the employer. Encouraging this type of
participant investment behavior over the long-term will undermine
the effectiveness of 401 (k) plans in providing retirement income
security.
Plan fiduciary policy involves only 401 (k) plans that offer company stock as an investment option. Under the 404(c) Regulations,
such plans are subject to special fiduciary rules designed to protect
participants from undue employer influence in exercising their
313
rights as owners of company stock. Under these rules the primary
safeguard for plan participants is the voluntary appointment of an
independent fiduciary to handle transactions related to company
314
stock. This appointment must be made by the employer's own
designated monitoring fiduciary if it is necessary to preserve the
confidentiality of plan participants in exercising their stock owner· . h 315
Sh Ip ng ts.
A judicial standard of strict scrutiny for compliance with the
special rules for company stock is both necessary and appropriate
for the federal courts to use in resolving cases invoking plan fidu316
ciary policy issues. Strict judicial scrutiny will send a strong signal
to the employee benefits community that employers should err on
the side of caution by appointing an independent fiduciary in
mergers, acquisitions, and other types of corporate control contests when the employer's 401 (k) plan contains company stock.
Although the appointment of an independent fiduciary will necessarily place an increased burden on the employer, this burden is
justified by the need to ensure employers do not improperly or
unduly influence participants who have invested in company stock.
Strict judicial scrutiny also is consistent with the employer's fiduciary responsibility to select prudently the investment options
for the 401 (k) plan. 317 Mter all, the 404(c) Regulations do not require the employer to include company stock as an investment
option; they merely permit it. 318 It is not unreasonable for employers who do decide to include company stock as an investment
313. See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
316. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 93-1280, at 305 (1974). reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038.
5086 ("The conferees expect that the [404(c)] regulations will provide more stringent standards with respect to determining whether there is an independent exercise of control
where the investment may inure to the direct or indirect benefit of the plan sponsor since
in this case participants might be subject to pressure with respect to investment decisions.").
317. See supra Part II.B.l.c.
318. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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option to expect that they will be held accountable for this fiduciary decision.
Finally, applying a strict scrutiny standard in individual cases
involving plan fiduciary policy is unlikely to create the same type of
industry-wide effect as judicial decisions determining plan
structural or operational policy.319 The facts and circumstances
surrounding cases giving rise to allegations of undue employer
influence will be unique to each employer and, therefore, easily
distinguishable from subsequent cases.

III.

REMEDIES

Nowhere is the federal courts' impact on national policy more
320
evident than in the area of ERISA remedies. Supreme Court interpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions have created several
novel remedy issues the federal courts must address in future
401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation.
The history of ERISA teaches that resolution of these issues is
likely to have a significant impact on national retirement policy.
The most prominent historical example of how judicial interpretations of ERISA remedies can negatively impact national policy lies
in the health care area. In that context the federal courts have,
through their interpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions, contributed to the situation where the claims of health care plan
participants are routinely dismissed for lack of a remedy under
ERISA,321 and where the persons who administer health care plans
are not legally accountable for what is perceived by many observers
to be self-dealing or even fraudulent misconduct, particularly by
322
health maintenance organizations.
Will the future hold the same for national retirement policy?
Much will depend on how the federal courts interpret and apply
ERISA's remedy provisions to 401 (k) plans.

319. See supra Part Il.B.3.b.
320. This discussion of available remedies under ERISA is limited to the situation
where a plan participant brings a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the plan's sponsoring employer. Remedies potentially available in other contexts, such as where a plan
fiduciary brings an ERISA claim against a co-fiduciary or a non-fiduciary service provider,
are beyond the scope of this Article.
321. E.g., Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 198-200 (1st Cir.
1997); McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1996).
322. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233-34 (2000) (holding that health maintenance organization reforms are a matter for Congress, not the federal courts).
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A. Supreme Court Interpretations ofERISA Remedies

If a federal court finds that a breach of fiduciary duty has oc-

curred, two remedy provisions potentially apply. The first, ERISA
section 502 (a) (2), operates in tandem with section 409 by author323
izing "appropriate relief under section 409" for plan participants.
ERISA section 409 (a) states in relevant part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use
of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to
such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.324
The second remedy provision, section 502(a)(3), authorizes a participant to "e~oin any act or practice which violates any provision
of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or ... to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief . . . redress such violations or . . . to
enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
,,325
I
pan.
A series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting these provisions has led to divergent paths. As interpreted by the Supreme
Court, section 502(a) (2) authorizes only relief payable to the plan
itself,326 whereas section 502(a)(3) authorizes relief to individual
327
plan participants. The two sections also differ as to the type of
relief that may be awarded. Under section 502(a)(2), money damages are available in addition to disgorgement of profits and other
328
appropriate equitable remedies. Under section 502(a) (3), however, an individual participant is limited to remedies "traditionally
viewed as 'equitable,' such as injunction or restitution.,,329 Money

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
Id. § 1109(a).
Id. § 1132(a)(3).
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 509-15 (1996).
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
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damages, the "classic form of legal relief," are not an available
remedy under section 502 (a) (3) .330
These divergent paths present crucial characterization issues for
the federal courts. A 401 (k) plan consists of a collection of indi331
vidual accounts, one for each plan participant. Thus, a threshold
issue for the federal courts will be to determine whether the
401 (k) plan participants are seeking relief for the plan (section
502(a)(2)) or the individual (section 502(a)(3)). Closely related
are questions of how to characterize the requested relief to determine whether it is the type of remedy authorized by the statute.
Supreme Court precedent does not address the unique remedy
issues raised by today's fiduciary litigation involving 401 (k) plans.
In the discussion below, three remedy scenarios are analyzed in
which the federal courts are most likely to encounter these issues
in order to highlight the policy implications of possible judicial
interpretations of ERISA's remedy provisions. Each remedy scenario concludes by suggesting a principled course for the federal
courts to follow that is in keeping with both the letter and the
spirit of ERISA.

B. Remedy Scenarios

1. The "/ Lost Money" Scenario--In an "I lost money" scenario,
the plaintiff-participants seek to recover either fees and expenses
deducted from their accounts or a loss of principal to their 401 (k)
plan accounts. These losses may be experienced by all participants
in the 401 (k) plan. For example, a deduction type of loss may
result from a breach of the duty of prudence because the employer
selected investment options that charged excessive investment
management fees to plan participants. Alternatively, the losses may
be a loss of principal experienced by some, but not all, of the
401 (k) plan participants. For example, a subset of plan
participants may have established successfully a breach of the
employer's duty of prudent diversification of plan assets that
330. [d. The federal courts have not reached consensus on a principled basis for distinguishing between impermissible money damages and permitted equitable remedies under
section 502(a)(3). See Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 147-50 (2d Cir. 1999);
Kerr v. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1999); Allinder v. Inter-City Prods.
Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 551-53 (6th Cir. 1998); Farr v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 151
F.3d 908, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1998); Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 153 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997); Buckley Dement, Inc. v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs, 39 F.3d 784, 787--88 (7th Cir. 1994).
331. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 19, at 50.
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resulted in investment losses to their individual accounts, and the
employer's defense under the 404(c) Regulations has failed.
Should the federal courts attempt to distinguish between these
two examples? One way to draw such a distinction is to say that a
fiduciary breach that has harmed all of the plan's participants falls
under the plan-wide remedies of section 502(a) (2), whereas a fiduciary breach that affects only some individual plan participants
falls under the individual relief remedies of section 502(a) (3). A
closer analysis, however, reveals that this type of line-drawing is superficial. Even though all of the plan participants in the first
example may have paid excessive investment management fees,
they are unlikely to have suffered equally from the employer's imprudence.

The excessive investment fees charged are likely to vary with each
participant's individual choice of investment options for his ac332
count. Therefore, in ordering a remedy that truly restores these
losses to the "plan," the federal court must look past the plan to
the loss experienced by each individual participant. 333 What may at
first appear to be an appealing bright line distinction between the
two examples in application quickly becomes blurred. In both examples, the federal court will have to look beyond the symbolism
of the plan to analyze the amount of the excessive fees that were
deducted from each participant's individual account.
There is another, more significant, policy reason for the federal
courts to treat both examples similarly. If the federal court rules
that a fiduciary breach affecting fewer than all of the plan's participants can only be remedied under section 502(a)(3), the
limited traditional equitable remedies available under this section
may leave this subset of participants without any relief at all, or
"betrayed without a remedy.,,334 Such a result-a fiduciary breach
with no available remedy-nullifies the fiduciary responsibility
provisions of ERISA. Such an interpretation sends a clear signal to
the employee benefits community that employers may disregard
their statutory obligations with impunity. The long-term policy

332. Medill, supra note 22, at 58-60.
333. I view this as means to consider the compounded effect of subsequent lost investment earnings. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. These subsequent lost investment
earnings could, however, also be characterized as an opportunity loss. See infra Part III.B.2.
334. To award relief under section 502 (a)(3) in the second example, the restoration of
investment losses resulting from the employer's breach of its duty of prudent diversification,
would be "restitution." Effectively, however, what will be paid is money. When, if ever, an
award of money in ERISA fiduciary litigation can properly be characterized as restitution
and not money damages is one of the most contentious issues being litigated in the federal
courts today. Dana M. Muir, J<."'RlSA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L.
REv. 1,36-38 (1995); see sources cited supra note 330.
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consequence is likely to be a significant undermining of the effectiveness of 401 (k) plans in providing retirement income security.
The better judicial interpretation for both examples under the I
lost money scenario is to view the relief as flowing to the plan in
accord with section 502(a)(2), so long as the monetary award is
initially allocated to each participant's plan account rather than to
his personal pocketbook. Such a distinction easily can be made. In
both examples above, an award of money damages to the plan will
be made payable directly to the plan's trustee. The plan trustee will
then allocate the payment among the participants' individual accounts. The plaintiff-participants will be unable to access their
litigation award except through the normal operating provisions of
the plan. By requiring that the damages award must be paid to the
plan itself, this approach is consistent with ERISA's fundamental
purpose of protecting and preserving the retirement benefits the
401 (k) plan provides to its participants.
2. The I Should Have Earned More Money (Opportunity Loss)
Scenario-The opportunity loss scenario occurs when the plaintiffparticipants' alleged injury is not that their plan accounts have suffered a loss of principal or excessive fee deductions, but rather that
their accounts should have earned more money. In essence, their
retirement benefits, represented by the balance of their 401 (k)
plan accounts, are less than they otherwise would be because of the
employer's breach of fiduciary duty. Their loss is one of lost in•
335
vestment opportumty.
This scenario is likely to arise in the context of automatic en336
rollment 401 (k) plans. Recall that in an automatic enrollment
plan, the employer enrolls all of its eligible employees as participants and retains fiduciary responsibility for investing the
contributions of participants who fail to make an affirmative investment direction. 337 This default investment by the employer is
usually a safe, low-earning option, such as a stable value or money

335. An "opportunity loss" measure of damages under ERISA section 409 has been
used by the federal courts in a variety of other contexts. See GIW Ind. v. Trevor, Stewart,
Burton & Jacobson , Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733--34 (11th Cir. 1990); Dardaganis v. Grace Capital
Inc., 889 F.2d 12~7, 1243--44 (2d Cir. 1989); Donovan v. BieIWirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1055-56
(2d Cir. 1985); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716
F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Kerr v. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944-45
(8th Cir. 1999). The federal courts construe any uncertainty in quantifying an opportunity
loss attributable to a breach of fiduciary duty against the fiduciary, not the injured plan. E.g.,
Dardaganis, 889 F.2d at 1244; Bierwirth, 754 F.2d at 1056.
336. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
337. See supra Part II.
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338
market mutual fund. Thus, the participant's account never loses
money, but its investment earnings are far less than they would
have been had the employer chosen a more diversified range of
investments.
On the surface, the opportunity loss scenario represents merely
questions of semantics. Is an opportunity loss within the meaning
of section 502(a) (2), and therefore remediable under that provision? Alternatively, is restoring a lost opportunity closer in nature
to restitution, and thus an equitable remedy available under either
section 502(a)(2) or section 502(a)(3)? ERISA's legislative history
is silent on these questions.
The deeper policy issue is whether ERISA should remedy an opportunity loss type of injury in the 401 (k) plan setting? Here the
nature of retirement benefits provided by a 401 (k) plan argues
strongly for a remedy. It is the tax-deferred investment earnings
that build up inside the 401 (k) plan account, much more than the
participant's contributions, that will cause the participant's retirement benefit to grow over time to an amount that represents a
measure of retirement income security.339 Denying a remedy for
the lost opportunity of greater investment earnings significantly
undermines the very economic engine that makes 401 (k) plans
successful.
How the federal courts resolve this remedy issue will determine
the fate of automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. As noted above, if
the federal courts universally deny a remedy for the participants'
opportunity losses resulting from the employer's decision to invest
their undirected accounts in a money market fund, automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans with low-earning default investment options
may become the norm.
From the perspective of national retirement policy, promoting
the growth of automatic enrollment plans is desirable because
340
more people will be saVing for their retirement. Limiting employer liability by denying participants a remedy for opportunity
losses would encourage more employers to adopt automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans. But will allowing a remedy for the
participants' opportunity losses necessarily deter the growth of
automatic enrollment plans? To the contrary, if the federal courts
provide appropriate advice to the employee benefits community,

338. PROFIT SHARING/ 401 (K) COUNCIL OF AMERICA, supra note 215; Barnhart, supra
note 212; Eve Tahmincioglu, Ready or Not, Welcome to the 401(k) Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
2000, at CI0.
339. See supra note 88.
340. See supra note 213.
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the policy benefits of automatic enrollment plans will not only be
preserved, but can be greatly enhanced.
To follow this logic, assume that the federal courts decide that
the employer in the automatic enrollment example above is liable
for opportunity losses incurred by plan participants whose undirected accounts were invested in the money market fund. The
question for the employee benefits community then becomes how
to counsel an employer to structure its default investment option
under an automatic enrollment arrangement to best insulate the
employer from such liability. The federal courts can answer this
question in advance by providing clear and explicit guidance, or
advice, concerning the types of investments that will satisfY the
employer's interrelated fiduciary duties of prudence and prudent
diversification of plan assets in designing the plan's default investment option.
If these duties are fulfilled, over the long-term the participants
placed in the default investment option are likely to have a much
larger retirement benefit from their 401 (k) plan account, a clear
policy benefit. It is possible, of course, that the most prudently selected default investment option may nevertheless result in an
investment loss. If, however, the employer has satisfied its fiduciary
duties in structuring the default investment option, it should not
be liable for an investment loss. Under this approach, clear and
reliable advice to employers concerning their fiduciary duties in
selecting a default investment option can reduce significantly the
potential deterrent effect resulting from a determination that opportunity losses are remediable under ERISA.
Employers predictably will react to clear and reliable judicial advice by adopting default investment options for their automatic
enrollment plans that mirror the investment gains of the stock
market. One obvious choice is an index fund. Another possibility is
a balanced fund containing a mixture of investments in both
bonds and equities. Perhaps the most prudent choice will be to
select a "lifecycle" fund that corresponds to the age of the participant. If employers adopt these types of default investment options,
not only will more employees be saving for retirement, but over
the long-term, participants in the default investment option are
likely to have much larger 401 (k) plan retirement benefits. Conversely, judicial attempts at advicegiving in this area that are
inconsistent and confused will have a significant chilling effect on
the future growth of automatic enrollment 401 (k) plans.

3. The Employer Made Money Off Me ScenariQ-The "employer
made money off me" scenario occurs in cases in which the
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employer has breached its duty of loyalty by self-dealing with the
assets of the 401 (k) plan. This scenario may overlap with both the
"I lost money" and the "I should have made more money"
scenarios described above. For example, assume that the accounts
of the 401 (k) plan participants paid excessive investment
management fees to their employer, who is itself a plan service
provider. Under this scenario the plaintiff-participants will have
suffered a loss of principal, and the employer will have made a
341
pro fiIt.
It is also possible that the plaintiff-participants under this scenario may not have suffered a loss of principal, only an
opportunity loss. For example, the employer unilaterally replaces
the high-flying stock of another company (Company A) with its
own lesser performing company stock (Company B). The 401(k)
plan participants who used to hold Company A stock do not lose
money on their Company A stock, but they would have had a
greater investment return if they had been allowed to retain their
342
Company A stock instead.
As in the opportunity loss scenario, the question arises as to how
to define the "profit" that the employer must disgorge under section 502(a)(2). The profit made by the employer's breach in the
second example above is difficult to measure. Must there have
been a profit in the revenue/accounting sense? Will a rise in the
employer's company stock price due to increased demand created
by a large purchase for the 401 (k) plan constitute a profit? Or does
any benefit to the employer that is more than incidental constitute
a profit? Whatever measure of profit the federal courts adopt, any
ambiguities should be construed against the disgorging em343
ployer.
Fiduciary claims involving an employer's self-dealing in 401 (k)
plan assets also relate to whether the participants' claims are remediable under section 502(a) (2) or section· 502(a) (3).344 A
federal court has yet to rule that disgorgement of profits by the
employer falls within the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation
of "traditional equitable remedies" available to a plan participant
341. CJ. Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 99-CV-5417 (E.D. Pa. June 14,2000,
amended July 25, 2000) (presenting similar factual allegations), available at
http://www.newyorklifesuit.com/complaint.doc (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
342. CJ. Gottlieb v. SBC Communications, Inc., No. CV-OO-04139, AHM(MANx) (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 2000, amended Nov. 6, 2000) (asserting similar allegations), available at
http://www.airtouchsuit.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
343. CJ. Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that ambiguity in measurement of loss should be construed against the fiduciary); Donovan
v. BieIWirth, 754 F.2d 1049,1056 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
344. See supra Part IlIA

SPRING 2001]

Stock Market Volatility

543

under section 502(a) (3).345 Disgorgement is, however, a permitted
statutory remedy under section 502(a) (2).346 Thus, resolution of
this characterization issue may determine whether or not a remedy
exists at all for the plaintiff-participants.
Again, the better characterization from a policy perspective is a
remedy payable to the plan under section 502(a)(2). Employer
misuse and self-dealing in plan assets lay at the heart of the fiduciary misconduct that drove Congress to enact ERISA. 347 The best
way to deter such employer conduct is to allow for an effective
remedy.34R The more broadly these disgorged profits are defined by
the federal courts, the more effective this deterrent will be.

SUMMARY

Many workers today depend on their 401 (k) plan to provide
them with an adequate income during retirement. For these workers to achieve retirement income security, their 401 (k) plan
investments must perform well over their working lifetime. Employers' selection of investment options for the 401 (k) plan, a
fiduciary duty under ERISA, plays a critical role in determining
investment performance.
Federal court interpretation of this fiduciary duty will shape future national retirement policy. In interpreting employers' duty of
prudence, federal courts must balance the burden on each employer to investigate diligently investment options against the
importance of this task in determining the retirement income of
401 (k) plan participants. Federal courts should scrutinize, in particular, the level of fees associated with the investment options
selected by the employer because of their adverse long-term impact on 401 (k) plan retirement savings. The federal courts also
should apply a heightened standard of prudence if the employer
chooses to include company stock as an investment option because

345. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 266 (1993). The Supreme Court's decision
in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180, 2190-91 (2000),
permitted a disgorgement of profit-type remedy under ERISA section 502(a)(3) in a suit
brought by a employer-fiduciary against a nonjiduciary seroice provider who engaged in a prohibited transaction.
346. 29 U.S.C. § 1l09(a) (1994).
347. See H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 3-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639,464043; S. REp. No. 93-127, at 3-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4838, 4839-41.
348. See Bienoirth, 754 F.2d at 1056 (recognizing that fiduciary abuses may be deterred
by imposing personal liability on the fiduciary through ERISA's section 409 remedies).
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it presents a higher degree of investment risk than a diversified
mutual fund.
Interpretation of employers' duty presents a different policy
analysis for federal courts. Federal Courts must determine
whether, in selecting the 401 (k) plan investment options, employers have received permissible incidental benefits or engaged in
prohibited self-interested conduct. This Article illustrates how employers can engage in prohibited self-serving conduct when
selecting (or deciding whether to retain) 401 (k) plan investment
options. Such conduct may take the form of selecting investment
options with higher fees in exchange for lower out-of-pocket administrative costs for the employer. If the employer selects or
retains company stock as an investment option, numerous opportunities exist for conflicts of interest to arise between the employer
and the 401 (k) plan participants.
Employers today rely upon the Department of Labor's 404(c)
Regulations to allow participants to select among plan investment
options without incurring potential fiduciary liability. A number of
policy issues will arise as federal courts interpret the details of the
404 (c) Regulations. This Article cautions against judicial interpretations of the 404( c) Regulations that will have a potential chilling
effect on voluntary plan sponsorship by employers. This Article
also addresses an important exception to the 404(c) Regulations,
the automatic enrollment plan. The federal courts are urged to
interpret ERISA's duty of prudent diversification of plan assets and
remedy provisions to encourage the employer to select a default
investment option for automatically enrolled participants that is
broadly diversified in the equity markets, rather than a low-earning
money market fund.
Federal courts are likely to confront three potential remedy scenarios in future 401 (k) plan fiduciary litigation. Plan participants
may be injured by an employer's imprudent selection of investment options for the 401 (k) plan, either in the sense of a
monetary or opportunity loss. Alternatively, plan participants may
be injured by an employer's self-dealing misconduct with respect
to plan investment options. Consistent with Supreme Court and
existing federal caselaw concerning ERISA remedies, federal
courts can and should afford each type of injury a remedy.
The future of national retirement policy will be shaped by the
degree of retirement income security that participants achieve
through their 401 (k) plans. Stock market volatility places 401 (k)
plan participants at risk of having an inadequate income for their
retirement. Such risk will either be mitigated or exacerbated by
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the cumulative impact of judicial interpretations of ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions to individual 401 (k) plan cases brought before
the federal courts. The hypothetical litigation scenarios presented
in this Article illustrate the significant policy choices the federal
courts will confront, knowingly or unknowingly, when applying
ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions to 401 (k) plans. Finally, this Article challenges the federal courts to recognize and, most
importantly, embrace their policy-making role when rendering
decisions in individual cases.

